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ARMY GENERAL HOFFMANN COMMENTS ON POST-WWII DEVELOPMENTS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 5-16

[Editorial by Army General H. Hoffmann, member of the SED Central Committee and Minister for National Defense]

/Excerpt/ German imperialism has twice involved our people in wars with the Socialist Soviet Union. In doing this it contributed during the first attempted destruction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1918 to its own defeat and to the outbreak of the November Revolution, and during the second attempted destruction of socialism in 1941 to laying the basis for its own defeat.

The great lesson to be learned from this is that friendship with the Soviet Union is the life-giving element and guaranty of security for a free and democratic Germany. In the words of Ernst Thaelmann, the relationship with the Soviet Union is becoming for us the touchstone of proletarian internationalism, the key question for all turnabouts in the consciousness of the people of our republic, and a guideline for the conduct of our young generation.

This is manifested with particular clarity in the ranks of the armed forces of our worker-peasant power. If it is a matter of record for us today that the spirit of socialist comradeship-in-arms has become for all regimental units of our National People's Army and of the Border Troops an integral part of daily military life that can no longer be left out of consideration, then this is of incalculable value for the moral force and military strength of our regimental and battalion units. Whoever personally experienced in recent weeks how our young soldiers, who of course only know fascism and the postwar years from films, books and lectures, how they empathized with the legendary heroism of the Soviet Army in the Great

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Patriotic War, how they demonstrated by their attitude and behavior as young revolutionaries today their high respect and deep affection for the Soviet friends, such an observer perceived one thing very clearly: the men we have in our armed forces are friends of the Soviet Union with their whole heart and soul. They are determined to follow the example set by their Soviet comrades-in-arms who are just as committed to the defense of the GDR as they are to the defense of their Soviet homeland. These men who are equipped with outstanding political maturity, with solid professional knowledge and skills, with high readiness for action and a growing performance capacity--these men were not born with these characteristics. They all were first educated and trained in our socialist society and in the socialist armed forces to become upright fighter personalities--and this was done by the party of the working class, its officials and members, by the many unnamed communists at the workbench, in the school and within the state apparatus.

It is the honorable achievement of the SED and its Central Committee that in the armed forces the concern of the commanding officers for ideological work with the members of the army is at the center of all leadership and training from the very beginning. And it is a specially honorable achievement of our party and its central committee that class brotherhood and comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet Union and its glorious army has always remained at the center of our overall political and military activity, that it has become the pulsebeat of our life, an inexhaustible source of strength for the potential and steadfastness of our defense and security organs.

Development has taken a fundamentally different path in the FRG, despite the struggle, so rich in sacrifices, by communists and antifascists. If there are forces there, even in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, who are in favor of setting up peaceful and good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union, who derive benefits from the process of international detente and do not want to go back into the trenches of the cold-war, there are, however, in this imperialist state so many revanchist positions which have been built up, and so many new anti-Soviet and antisocialist rules and regulations and modes of behavior which are being continuously developed, that political realism and a policy oriented toward the future can only make a place for themselves with painful slowness. Precisely nowadays in the FRG they are once again having a difficult time digesting the results of the Second World War. Many a Bonn politician sometimes can, then again simply cannot get it through his head that the German imperialists not only gambled away the old German empire, they also forfeited their right to lead the German people, that their power now only extends as far as the Elbe and the Werra, and that all attempts to exercise a kind of guardianship over the citizens of the GDR is tilting at windmills.

And so a Franz Joseph Strauss traveled as far as the Great Wall of China at the beginning of 1975 to proclaim and to have confirmed that

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reunification like a law of nature will yet prevail and the NATO sphere of influence will extend far into the East. Strauss was received with high honors, even by Mao Tse Tung personally, for, as a West German evaluation has it, he had "everything to offer, which Chinese dream of when they think of a useful German: sturdy anti-Moscowism."¹

There was once a time when the CDU/CSU wanted "with the help of NATO to force the Soviet Union to give up the GDR and concur in a reunification Western style," wrote an FRG journalist. But the days of Dulles-Adenauer are gone. "If any one whosoever has in mind to revive once again that nearly mortal hostility against Moscow, then Germany and Europe will pay the bill for such madness. It is impossible to repeat in 1976 what already failed completely in 1960."

And as regards the speculative notion that concessions to West German revanchism can be attained by the exercise of Far Eastern pressure upon the Soviet Union, the same author concludes quite correctly: "And then there is the major mistake in the calculations of the friends of China: that is the assumption that the Soviets are afraid of the Chinese."²

German imperialists may feel that they are strong enough as the second greatest power in the imperialist system to exercise pressure on other imperialist states. They graciously accept the flattery of the US Secretary of Defense when he speaks of the "hub of the alliance" without which the NATO war wagons would not role. In fact, Defense Minister Leber of the FRG, in partnership with Mr Schlesinger during the recent NATO conferences, contributed decisively to the development whereby the other NATO partners promised increased armaments efforts and proclaimed, under the united pressure of Washington and Bonn, their resolve to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.

The Bonn politicians and military men, however, overestimate their might and their influence on the other regions of this world, and in particular their influence on the countries which lie eastward of the borders of their state, if they believe that they can prescribe, or what is even more, dictate to the GDR and the other socialist states how they should react to the new versions of the pretension to exclusive representation. When many a leading politician of Bonn, like Foreign Minister Genscher of the FRG, are of a mind not to deviate even a millimeter from revanchist positions, then they are biting on stone as far as we are concerned, and then, under the best of circumstances, all that they will gain with neutral states or even many a NATO ally is gentle irony.

Notwithstanding this, clear indications not to believe in any fundamental change whatsoever in the long-term goals of imperialistic policy in the FRG are the most recent attacks of the FRG against the foreign policy relations of other states, the shrill tones in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's official

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pronouncement "On the State of the Nation," and in the Bundestag debate of January 1975.

A report of the Politburo to the 13th Session of the Central Committee reads in this connection: "We know that violence, war, robbery and oppression arise from imperialism's innermost traits of character. These traits of character do not change, although external circumstances can block off their effects. It is the strength of the peaceful powers in the world, and, above all else, the strength of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist community which puts a limit to the brutality of imperialism."³

This strength has been developing continuously during recent decades. With the signing, 14 May 1955, of The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, the Soviet Union and other socialist states of Europe raised their political, economic and military cooperation to a new level. By this means they also gave full play to the objective inevitability of that historical law, which Marx and Engels had already pointed out: the socialist revolution, the construction of a socialist society and their reliable military defense are by their very nature profoundly international tasks. They require for this reason the joint and coordinated efforts of the working class of the individual countries, their revolutionary parties and all other progressive forces. A coalition arose with the Warsaw Pact that is of a completely new, socialist character, from whose social basis its peace preserving function arises by the inevitable working of historical law, and by means of which the Leninist demands for the collective defense of socialism have now been consistently implemented for the past two decades. The establishment and development of the socialist defensive alliance turned and still turns on that basic question, which Lenin raised as long ago as August 1918, when he dismissed the men of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment to the Front. Lenin emphasized at that time that armed struggle for the defense of socialism has as its goal "bringing about really international brotherhood among the peoples." Lenin said, "I am convinced...when you weld together all military strengths into a mighty international red army... then no imperialist power can match us!"⁴ The now 20-year history of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states has confirmed the world vision of this Leninist principle in the lives of our peoples and our armies.

Within and along with this alliance the armed forces of the GDR have also grown, and within a relatively short time have developed into a modern army that has made its contribution to "international brotherhood among the peoples." The concrete historical conditions under which the NVA of the GDR was founded and built up were different to be sure from the many fraternal armies of our coalition. These fraternal armies were born earlier in the midst of World War II, in the fire of the antifascist liberation struggle, and their first units and regimental formations, had

helped alongside the Soviet Army, to liberate their homeland from fascism. At the time of the signing of the Warsaw Pact, not only the Soviet Army but also the other fraternal armies already looked back over extensive combat traditions of their own, a portion of their regiments and divisions possessed experience in armed combat, and the officers and generals at the various command levels were also able during the years following the second World War to educate themselves still further, many of them at Soviet military academies.

Notwithstanding this, our army developed rapidly and soon was able to take over responsible tasks in the defense of the western borders of the Warsaw Pact states. This was not because we were exceptionally bright or exceptionally capable, but because we were given intensive assistance. For who taught the German communists and antifascists modern military methods? Who helped the former members of the Free Germany National Committee and the FDJ to form military units and regimental formations? Who was it who never abandoned us under any circumstances, we who in the beginning were inexperienced military cadres? Who taught the miner and tractor driver how modern operations and battles are conducted? Who gave us mighty weapons, reliable instruments, and trained our specialists in the use of these?

There is only one answer to these and other questions! It was the soldiers and sailors, the sergeants and petty officers, the officers, the generals, admirals and marshals, the workers and kolkhoz peasants in the combat tunics of the Red October Army. That is something we ought not, should not and will never forget!

That is the way the ring of events circles and closes. The Soviet Army, which in liberating the German people from Hitler-fascism also created the basic preconditions for our democratic and socialist development, made an essential contribution to the socialist national defense of the GDR. For years on end, it alone guaranteed the external defense of the Worker and Peasant Power, and even today still bears the principal burden for the defense of socialism in Central Europe.

In 1945 the troops of the Soviet army and of the Polish army, which had liberated the territory of the present-day GDR, were under the command of Marshals Zhukov, Konev and Rokossovsky.

In 1955 I had the great honor of participating, as chief of the then Garrisoned People's Police, in the signing of the Warsaw Pact. Sitting in the front row were Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovsky, defense ministers respectively of the USSR and Poland, and Marshal Konev as the first commander in chief of the united armed forces.

Today, 20 years after this historical date and 30 years after the Liberation, it is the students and assistants of those legendary Soviet army commanders

who today, at the head of the Soviet Armies, military regions and fleets, command the principal forces of the united socialist military might.

We have in fact no reason at all to be concerned about the security of socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Besser: "Just the Man for Peking." In: VORWAERTS (Bonn), 23 Jan 75.
2. Ibid.
3. From the Report by the Politburo to the 13th Session of the SED Central Committee. Reporter: Comrade Erich Honecker, Berlin, 1974, p 67.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Works," Vol 28, Berlin, 1959, p 26.

INTENSIFICATION OF COOPERATION IN WARSAW PACT PRAISED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 26-34

[By Horst Neubauer]

/Text/ The peoples of our community of socialist states will celebrate on 14 May 1975 the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance--the Warsaw Pact. The formation of this collective military and political organization of socialist states was an event of great historical importance. There is embodied in it the will of the member states, closely ranged around the Soviet Union, to protect the revolutionary changes in Europe, which took place after the Second World War. The continued strengthening and perfectioning of our socialist military coalition and raising its power of defense have made it an invincible barrier against all aggressive deeds of imperialism, and guaranteed peaceful conditions for the socialist states to build up socialism and communism.

As a political alliance it makes possible a continuing exchange of information about experiences in building up socialism, and also operational coordination and reciprocal accomodation of the foreign and security policies of our parties and states as well as agreements about joint steps to be taken in the international arena.

With the establishment of the socialist defense organization a solid shield was raised against NATO, the instrument for implementing the class interests of imperialism. It was a decisive step taken for forestalling any open military adventure by the imperialist bloc against the countries of socialism, because any such operation, from that time on, would have placed the existence of imperialism itself in jeopardy.

It was not an easy and smooth path that the fraternal socialist countries had to traverse. There were many problems and difficulties to master in building up socialism. L. I. Brezhnev, secretary-general of the CPSU Central Committee, formulated it this way at the 24th Party Congress: "The present-day socialist world, with its successes and prospects, and with all its problems, is still a young, growing social organism in which not all has yet become stabilized, and which still bears the mark of past historical epochs."¹ What was involved then was simultaneously to conduct a permanent war against the remains of the old social order, and also against the ceaseless attempts of the class enemy to reconquer his lost positions. Imperialism brought to bear its entire arsenal of weapons, from military and economic pressure, through foreign policy discrimination and ideological diversions, to attempts at counterrevolutionary interventions. But over and over again the Warsaw Pact proved to be a solid and invincible fighting and class alliance of the fraternal socialist countries which held up against all attacks and widened the opportunities of our countries for accomplishing their national and international tasks.

Constructive Foreign Policy of the Warsaw Pact States

The Warsaw Pact organization became the principal center for coordinating the foreign policy activity of the fraternal socialist countries. All important measures and steps in the international arena were jointly prepared and carried out. From the very first moment of its foundation on, the Warsaw Pact member states conducted an active and constructive policy which is aimed at maintaining and guaranteeing peace. This already finds expression in the very preamble, which reads that the participants are concluding this treaty "with a renewed proclamation of their striving to create a system of collective security in Europe, based on the participation of all European states, regardless of their social order and state organization, such as will make it possible to unite their aspirations and efforts for the sake of guaranteeing peace in Europe."²

Based on this fundamental point of view, every session of the Political Advisory Committee produced appropriate initiatives for the consideration of the governments of the European states, of the people of Europe and of the entire world. Here are a few important proposals:

The Warsaw Pact states, at the 1956 January session in Prague, called for the creation of a collective security system in Europe;

The Moscow session in 1958 approached the NATO states with the draft of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact;

In Bucharest in July 1966 the participant states released a statement about US aggression in Vietnam and a declaration containing proposals for strengthening peace and security in Europe;

Finally, in April 1974 the meeting provided important initiatives for deepening the process of detente in Europe, for supplementing and enlarging political detente with measures for military detente and for carrying out a conference for security and cooperation in Europe. The session addressed important appeals to world public opinion about the situation in Indochina, the Near East and in Chile.

Much more could be added to this list. Everywhere and over and over again it has been shown that the Warsaw Pact has been the starting point for important political initiatives, that its peace offensive has exercised an extraordinarily positive influence on the development in Europe and in the world at large. Manifested herein are the goals of socialist foreign policy which were so clearly set forth at the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "...to guarantee favorable international conditions for building up socialism and communism; the unity and determination of the socialist countries to strengthen their friendship and fraternity, to support the national liberation movement, to cooperate in all manner of ways with the young developing states, to fight consistently on behalf of the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders, to inflict a decisive defeat on the aggressive forces of imperialism, and to protect mankind against a new world war."³

Today, after 20 years, we have every right to state as a fact: The Warsaw Pact has proved itself as an instrumentality for ensuring peace. It contributed decisively to strengthening unity and to the further closing of ranks of the fraternal socialist states around the Soviet Union, to the formation of a community of socialist states as a tightly integrated and dynamically developing organism. The peoples of the Soviet Union, led by the Leninist Communist Party, have played the decisive role herein. The outstanding accomplishments and successes of Soviet workers in the creation of the material-technical basis of communism multiplied the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union, its political importance in the international arena. By the same token the might and strength of the socialist states united in the Warsaw Alliance grew simultaneously.

Thanks to their high defensive power, their internal stability and political activity, the Warsaw Pact states contributed decisively to the fact that we can look back over a 30-year period of peace in Europe. Success was achieved in preventing a new world conflagration. It is with great satisfaction that we can state that the goals and tasks which are contained in the Warsaw Pact, and which were sketched in advance by the peace program of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, have largely been fulfilled. The trend toward detente became the dominating trend in world politics. The policy of peaceful coexistence made important progress.

The definitive character of the borders which came into being as a result of the Second World War, and their inviolability, was confirmed in the

treaties which the USSR, the Polish People's Republic, the CSSR, and the GDR concluded with the FRG. This system of treaties, which includes the quadripartite agreement for West Berlin, has proven to be a significant step on the path toward detente, to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, whose third phase is now coming up. It contributed most essentially to the development of cooperation between the socialist and capitalist states of Europe on the foundation of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

For an increasing number of persons, whether friend or foe, it is becoming clear that the Warsaw Pact states have exercised the decisive influence in the change in the international balance of power in favor of socialism, which has been going on in recent years, and in the changeover from the cold war to detente which has gotten under way in Europe. What is at stake is to make this process irreversible and to extend it beyond Europe outward over other regions of the world also. Here the conclusion of the conference for security and cooperation at the highest levels, and the documents resulting from this which will have to be signed, will exert a most propitious influence. At the same time it is necessary to make efforts to supplement and enlarge political by military detente. For this reason the Warsaw Pact states are coming forward with initiatives which will influence positively the course of the Vienna negotiations for the reduction of military forces and armaments in Central Europe. The socialist states are ready to go through with such reductions on the basis of the same undiminished security; that means, no participating state ought to gain military advantages from it at the expense of others.

The GDR, an Active Member of the Warsaw Pact

We can conclude with satisfaction that the role and the influence of the Warsaw Pact community has risen. Every member country, but above all the Soviet Union, has made a big contribution to this. As citizens of the GDR we are proud that our fatherland is a member of this family of those who feel and think the same way, who organize their relations with one another on the basis of socialist internationalism. The GDR is an active member of the Warsaw Pact. Its policy is based on the premise that every communist party is not only responsible to its own people, but also to the overall community of socialist states and to the world communist movement, for strengthening the position of socialism. National and international obligations must constitute an indissoluble unity. This was expressed quite clearly in the report of the first secretary of the SED Central Committee, Erich Honecker, at the 13th plenary session of the Central Committee: "At every step of our coordinated foreign policy the overriding principles which prevail are: the unity of the socialist community, the security of the socialist states, the interests of the world communist movement."⁴

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Based on these are the findings of the Political Advisory Committee, in whose meetings the GDR participates actively, a basic motif for decisions concerning the development of the socialist society and also for our foreign policy activity. The documents of the Warsaw Pact meetings provide the basic guidelines for the joint activity of our parties and states. Experience so far confirms that the better, the more conscientiously and the more innovatively richer we fulfill the tasks which arise from this, just that much stronger will the importance of our community be in international class confrontation. Fulfillment of the tasks in the economy is a decisive basic precondition for maintaining our national defense at the required level.

We regard the strengthening of socialism in each country and in the socialist community as a whole as the first task and obligation of the fraternal socialist states arising from membership in the Warsaw Pact. Thus it is that it is fully and completely in accord with the decisions of the Warsaw Pact when the Eighth SED Congress declared that the all-round strengthening of our republic to be a top-priority duty. The creation of an advanced socialist society in the GDR, and its reliable protection of the Western section of the socialist front, is regarded by us as the most important revolutionary class assignment that the international communist and worker movement has placed upon the working class of the GDR. Its successful fulfillment requires close fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal states, the firm anchoring of the GDR in the community of socialist states. As is stated in the Central Committee report to the Eighth SED Congress, that has become a basic condition for the realization of our vital interests, "...because by combining together the forces of the fraternal countries the advantages of socialism for the welfare of the workers of every socialist state, and therewith also of ours in the GDR, will prevail soonest and best take effect;

Because through the collective defensive alliance of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, especially through the military shield of the Soviet Army, peace and security for the people of the GDR are reliably protected;

Because socialism is by its very nature internationalist, and the slogan of Marx and Engels, 'Proletarians of the World, Unite!' is fulfilled at a higher level by the collaboration of socialist countries."⁵

Out of consideration for all this, the GDR successfully deepened its relations with the states of the socialist community. Along with the Warsaw Pact, the GDR has ties with fraternal socialist countries on the basis of manifold agreements and understandings. All of these ought not to be regarded in isolation from our joint league and alliance. To the contrary, the Warsaw Pact finds its effective completion and fulfillment precisely in bilateral obligations, in treaties of friendship and assistance between fraternal socialist states.

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The Harmonious Accord of Basic Interests and Goals

Among the countries of the community of socialist states, which is demonstrating ever more strongly the influence of existentially real socialism in the world today, there exist objectively determined harmonious accords of basic interests and goals. The policy of our fraternal parties is aimed at promoting the process of rapprochement of our countries and peoples on the basis of this accord, and to develop planned and all-round cooperation on the basis of socialist internationalism. The magnitude of the tasks, their increasing complexity on the one hand, and on the other, the still extant, historically conditioned differences in level of development, as well as other national and geographical peculiarities, pose ever higher demands on the action of every individual fraternal party. It depends above all on the ability of the Marxist-Leninist Party to carry out a policy which is appropriate to the objective requirements for building socialism and for meeting the international situation, how great progress in socialist development will be in each country and in our community, or, how successfully national and international interests are brought into accord.

Almost all fraternal parties, like our own party, are facing upcoming congresses. The congresses will draw the balance as to what successes were achieved in building the advanced socialist society, and lay down the tasks which next must follow. A further visible upswing in social life can be seen in all countries of the socialist community. The USSR has made a further important step forward in the creation of the material-technical basis of communism on the basis of the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress. With this its role as the principal force of socialism has become even more conspicuous.

In the other member states of the Warsaw Pact the tasks of the advanced socialist society are being accomplished successfully, or being taken in hand. This means that a number of fraternal countries find themselves in approximately the same stage of development. Three or four years ago, a new important stage of development was introduced in our community with the congresses of the fraternal parties. It was characterized by growing joint activities, an increasing number of identical or similar tasks, which our parties, states and peoples have to accomplish.

1. It is a matter here, first of all, of the principal task assigned, which by its very nature is the same in all our fraternal countries. Beyond this, it is a matter of accomplishing such important tasks as:

--raising the leading role of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party;

--intensification of the economy and raising its effectiveness;

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--solution of the energy and raw materials problems;

--fulfillment of the socialpolitical program, in which housing construction takes a particularly important place;

--the further perfection of socialist democracy.

2. All party congresses agree in according extraordinary importance to socialist economic integration. All fraternal parties are agreed that a necessary and timely step is speeding up the fulfillment of the comprehensive program.

3. The peace program adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress became a joint action program for all fraternal countries united in the Warsaw Pact. On this basis it became possible, as mentioned before, to bring about important changes in the international situation.

Deepening Cooperation

The increasingly collective nature in setting tasks and going about their solution is creating favorable preconditions for raising the effectiveness of the exchange of experience. It is opening up new potential for intensifying cooperation, and it is widening the basis for still closer integration of our community of socialist states ranged around their principal power, the Soviet Union. At the same time it has also been established that deepening cooperation between the fraternal socialist countries in the various areas of activity is increasingly proving to be a decisive factor in the progress being made by every single country in building up socialism. The communique of the April 1974 session of the Political Advisory Committee in Warsaw reads: "The participants in the meeting emphasized with satisfaction the further development of universal cooperation among the fraternal states, which is speeding the growth of economic potential, strengthening the defense capability of the participating countries of the Warsaw Pact, and contributing to raising the level of living of the peoples and also to the development of culture and science."⁶

On the basis of the findings of the Political Advisory Committee, and also on those of the Crimea meeting of the First Secretaries of Secretaries-General of our fraternal parties, it has been possible, especially in the years since the 24th CPSU Congress, to strengthen significantly relations among the states of our community, and to develop these. Especially the close cooperation among our fraternal parties became in ever stronger measure a driving force in the relations among our states in all other areas of activity.

Negotiations between party and government delegations, and also work meetings of the first secretaries of our fraternal parties serve for the exchange of

Information and experience about building up socialism in our countries, for operational coordination of foreign policy activity, and for agreeing upon joint tasks in the development of relations. Just in 1974 alone, within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the leadership of the GDR party and state had official meetings with a party and government delegation from the USSR, which was led by the secretary-general of the CPSU Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, and also with the leading personalities of the Polish People's Republic, the CSSR, and the Bulgarian People's Republic. The bi- and multilateral meetings among the secretaries of the central committees of our fraternal parties are also gaining in importance. During these consultations the main lines of cooperation in certain areas are laid down. Especially important for political-ideological and organizational cooperation of our parties and states were the meetings of the central committee secretaries for ideology or for foreign policy of December 1973 and also of the secretaries for party work problems held in January 1974. The results of these consultations created the basis for close cooperation and coordination in political-ideological education work of the fraternal parties and also in the ideological confrontations with class opponents.

Precisely in the present stage of building up socialism and of international development, in view of the reinforced influence of socialism in the world arena, and of the growing necessity for a confrontation with bourgeois ideology, joint analysis of new phenomena and developmental processes, the exchange of experience about forms, methods and content of ideological work and also the operational coordination of concrete joint steps are increasing in importance. There is developing according to plan and with increasing effectiveness the exchange of delegations and the exchange of experience among our Marxist-Leninist parties. The SED was indeed able to study valuable experiences of the fraternal parties, especially those of the CPSU, and make this useful for the building of socialism in the GDR. Simultaneously the fraternal parties studied and took advantage of SED experiences.

Far advanced and clearly profiled are cooperation and joint approaches of our parties and states to matters of military and security policy. The unified command is performing outstanding work for the defense of socialist achievements. It is in charge of the training of the troop contingents placed in its command.

Since the January 1956 meeting of the Political Advisory Committee in Prague, contingents of the NVA also belong to the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. The unified command regularly carries out staff command exercises and troop maneuvers on the territories of the allied states. In the course of these the collaboration of the united armed forces with national troop contingents and staffs is also tested. The armed forces of the allied states have been found to be at the required level of combat readiness.

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The joint defense policy, joint weapons systems and military techniques resulted in a significant strengthening of the defense potential of the Warsaw Pact states.

Economic cooperation among the Warsaw Pact states on the basis of the CEMA Comprehensive Program for socialist economic integration plays a special role in their interrelationships. The CEMA states, especially the Soviet Union, possess a gigantic economic potential, which constitutes the basis for dynamic growth of their economy and the purposeful realization of the comprehensive program. That puts them in a position of being able to accomplish in jif time the principal task set by the party congresses. And this, to be sure, at a point in time when imperialism in all areas of life is being shaken by an all-embracing crisis, when prices and unemployment figures are rising and the standard of living of the working class is sinking.

The results which the CEMA states have achieved since the adoption of the comprehensive program in 1971 justify the rightness of the path chosen and, at the same time, call for systematic acceleration of the tempo of the integration process. Success was achieved in accomplishing important economic tasks by joint work or at least tackling their solution, something which proved useful to every country and to our community as a whole.

In this manner comprehensive projects for the better coverage of our raw materials and energy requirements were and are still being accomplished. Think, in this connection, of the gas and oil pipelines, atomic power plants, the energy network systems or of the joint new productive capacities for iron smelting, cellulose production and other things. Specialization and cooperation among the fraternal socialist states was further deepened. However, reserves are still to be found here. Joint activity on their part in science and research, project planning and production was further developed to an essential degree. All this goes to make up a pleasing balance statement of joint efforts, but still does not mean that cooperation is going forward free of problems and without difficulties. Just the variation in the level of development of the different economies, the complexity of the problems to be solved, differences in economic structure, in raw materials and labor force reserves, can lead to certain problems and conflicts, which, however, will be overcome by the joint efforts of the fraternal parties.

The Warsaw Pact states have achieved outstanding results both in building socialism and communism and also in the international arena thanks to their joint activities. These successes confirm the correctness of the line jointly laid down by the Political Advisory Committee, the foreign ministers or the committee of the defense ministers. It was not easy to accomplish such results. They depended on and required great labor, full of sacrifices, by our peoples. We can conclude with pride that nowhere in the world has there been such a successful development as that achieved by the socialist states united in the Warsaw Pact.

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With satisfaction we can say as a conclusive fact that our alliance, in this 20th year of its existence, has proven itself and contributed decisively to strengthening the unity and resolution of our fraternal countries, ranged round the Soviet Union, and to improving the international atmosphere. But imperialism still possesses strong forces. The opponents of detente are increasing their activity. The armaments expenditures of the NATO states were never as high. The situation calls for extreme alertness, and careful observance of the actions of the imperialist states. Every step on the path to detente has to be won by struggle from imperialism. From this there results the necessity of keeping our powder dry, of further strengthening our socialist defensive alliance, and to develop all aspects of its activity. For this reason strengthening our fraternal socialist states, raising their defensive strength, comprehensive coordination of foreign and security policy and also deepening socialist economic integration are all an important precondition for the further shifting of the balance of power in favor of socialism and for the continuation of the process of detente.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev: Operations Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 20th Party Congress, Moscow/Berlin, 1971, p 20.
2. The Warsaw Pact for Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Berlin, 1960, p 21
3. L. I. Brezhnev: op. cit., p 8.
4. From the report of the Politburo at the 13th Session of the SED Central Committee. Reporter: Comrade Erich Honecker, Berlin, 1974, p 66.
5. Central Committee Report to the Eighth SED Congress. Reporter: Comrade Erich Honecker, Berlin, 1971, p 13.
6. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (B Edition), 19 Apr 74.

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NATO SEEN AS DANGER TO WORLD PEACE

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 46-54

[By Col Dr A. Charisius and Lt Col Dr T. Dobias both of the GDR Military History Institute]

/Text/ As of 1974 the North Atlantic Pact had been in existence 25 years. The ledger balance of this Holy Alliance of our times is negative. This Pact, aimed against the three principal revolutionary currents, has never achieved its aggressive and reactionary goals. Its antisocialist line of attack, above all, for whose sake it was established in the first place, at the instigation the American monopoly bourgeoisie, in April 1949, ended in fiasco. The political and military strategic concepts ("roll back," "massive retaliation," "indirect strategy," "flexible strategy" and others), which were closely tied in with the build up and development of US global strategy, were shattered and all came to nought, as is well known, against the dynamically developing strength of the socialist states.

Socialism has not been extinguished in Europe, but has demonstrated its historical superiority over the imperialist states, and forced NATO into the defensive. This process, which grew stronger with the turn into the 1970's, has brought it about that the peace policy, actively pursued by the community of socialist states, did prevail, and that political detente, not open military confrontation, has come to characterize international relations in Europe.

However, to be sure, neither the aggressive nature of imperialism nor NATO potential for military aggression have been weakened by this. This Pact is still a source of danger for peace now as it has always been because it follows an essentially antisocialist policy and military strategy along

with a corresponding outlay for war armaments, just as it has done throughout its 25-year history. Two closely interrelated processes largely govern its development along these lines at the present time.

First, the international balance of power shifted further in favor of socialism, and of the revolutionary workers movement and the national liberation movement which are closely tied to it.

The growth in the military might of the Soviet Union, and with it of the community of socialist states, has undermined the foundation of the imperialist "Policy of Strength," which in various forms has characterized the military policy profile of the principal NATO powers and the principles of military strategy pursued by the Pact. The creation of further real preconditions for peaceful coexistence among states with different social organization has once again diminished the room for maneuver in NATO operations. The USSR also succeeded in 1974, especially in the Vladivostok negotiations, in reaching agreements or understandings with the United States for a definite quantitative and in the future also qualitative limitation of the strategic arms race, which diminish the danger of a worldwide nuclear war. Overall, the opportunities for NATO to deploy military aggressiveness were decisively reduced by the Warsaw Pact states.

Second, the consequences of the qualitatively new phase in the general crisis of capitalism are being revealed ever more sharply for NATO. On various planes within the Pact the contradictions of imperialism are growing deeper. The Pact, to an ever increasing degree is drawn in the wake of conflicts and rivalries between imperialist centers. The antagonism between the United States and capitalist Western Europe--especially the EEC--stands out ever more clearly as the principal antagonism. For the first time reference was openly made in the communiqus of meetings of the top NATO organs in December 1974 to the consequences of inflation, the energy crisis and the complicated economic situation as it affects the further development of the North Atlantic Pact. To this is added the further polarization of the class forces and the sharpened tension of the class struggle in many NATO states.

However, all these clearly visible crisis and erosion phenomena observable in NATO most recently do not cancel out the dominant long range effects of the thrust of the antisocialist alliance of imperialist states. Ruling circles of monopoly capital and the principal powers of NATO as well as the majority of small Pact states also continue as before to place all their hopes on NATO as the basis and instrumentality of the foreign and military policy. In view of this unchanged role of the Pact, the first secretary of the SED Central Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker, declared in September 1974: "Certain imperialist forces are increasing their efforts to perfect NATO as a military instrumentality and to protect it from the growing crisis phenomena of capitalism...Thus it is revealed that the military policy of

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Imperialism now as always is directed toward the strategic goal of destroying socialism."¹

Modified Policy of Strength

All essential developments which are currently going on within the North Atlantic Pact have a common denominator: adaptation of NATO to the changed strategic situation of imperialism by maintaining or restoring of inner stability, and increased political, but first priority military effectiveness of the Pact. Two tendencies stand out here in the policy of the ruling circles of the principal powers in the Pact. On the one hand their position is characterized by a certain partial realism vis-a-vis the new power relationships to the point where they are forced to understand that a general nuclear war is not presently an appropriate modality for imperialist policy, without, however, ceasing to prepare for it. On the other hand, the adaptation is viewed by very influential circles in the principal NATO powers as a long-term process, in the course of which imperialism ought to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Pact states. This presupposes resolving the contradictions within their Pact, and further intensifying the armaments race. The backbone of such an aggressively oriented adjustment in this form is moreover the effort to attain a position of military strength, even if in varied forms and less global but rather regional, adjusted in each case to the concrete pattern of forces. This has been drastically demonstrated most recently by statements of leading American politicians above all.

Secretary of State H. Kissinger proclaimed anew in a speech on 20 August 1974 that the United States is striving "to bring its military strength into harmony with its foreign policy goals."² In this manner shall be guaranteed that the goals of US imperialism will be attained both in opposition to the principal currents of the world revolutionary movement and also in opposition to its own partners in the alliance. Kissinger was of the opinion that "if other nations have confidence in our goals and give our words full credence, then America must remain an unequaled military power." For, according to Kissinger, "the military might of America is the foundation of our diplomatic strength."³

The unconcealed threat made by Kissinger 2 January 1975 against the oil-producing Arab states is also to be understood in this sense. For he did not exclude the direct use of US armed forces to protect the maximum profits of the multinational monopolies. The President of the United States, G. Ford, has expressed a similar point of view. In one of his first messages to Congress he emphasized that "The strength and manifold nature of our armed forces, our freedom of decision to patrol international waters which are sites of unrest--all this is essential for our security."⁴ This high positional value of military might as a basis and instrumentality for an expansive foreign policy is the essential stimulus for the armaments

race being carried on globally by the United States and regionally by the European Pact states. It also should not be overlooked that in recent months the activities of the opponents of detente have grown stronger and that their influence in the policy and military strategy of NATO is rising.

Indicative of this is the mode of coming into being and the content of the "Declaration Concerning Atlantic Relationships" which was signed 26 June 1974 by the heads of state or government of the 15 NATO states in Brussels. Joint military-political questions lie at the heart of this declaration, and this in opposition to be sure to the original intention of the United States, which had wanted to bundle together the economic, political and military relationships of NATO in a New Atlantic Charter. The predominantly military-political statements of the declaration are highly suggestive for the future course of NATO, but they also show that the Pact still holds to the joint antisocialist military-political platform, and that "it intends to raise the performance capability of its armed forces qualitatively."⁵

Typical of the specific NATO style of adaptation furthermore should be recorded the sweeping, unanimous approval at the last meeting of the executive organs of the Pact, Dec 1974, of the "double strategy" of the Pact. According to the formula "Arm + Negotiate = Security," NATO makes use within the framework of this strategy both of more flexible political tactics and of armed might. By a demonstrative exhibition of military strength, socialist states are to be put under pressure, treaties already concluded and negotiations in progress are to be exploited for the sake of NATO interests, and, above all else, a process of inner erosion of socialist society and the order within the state is to be induced by means of ideological diversions. NATO's double strategy also determines the destructive attitude of the Pact states in many questions at the European Security Conference in Geneva, as it does the unacceptable demands of the participating NATO states at the Vienna Conference on the Reduction of Troops and Armaments in Central Europe. These last have as their ultimate purpose winning one-sided military advantages by the so-called asymmetrical reductions in the land forces of the USSR and the United States in the reduction zone. Their proposals are intended to change the military balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Defensive Alliance in favor of imperialism.

This unrealistic attitude does damage to the principle of equal security already acknowledged and accepted by all participants, and creates difficulties for substantial agreements to reduce troops and limit armaments in Central Europe.

From the NATO Secretary-General's office there also came highly skeptical comments on the American-Soviet summit talks at Vladivostok. NATO clings stubbornly to its basic military-political principles, to the military

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"balance of forces," and to "graduated deterrence," and this has logically led to the continued retention of a flexible military strategy (Directive MC 14/3 of 16 January 1968). This, however, is the result born in the 1960's from the above-named principles. The US secretary of defense, J. Schlesinger, reaffirmed this again in June 1974: "NATO strategy is deterrence--a deterrence which extends over the entire scale of risks, from political pressure to a total nuclear attack."⁶

Nevertheless the process of adapting NATO military strategy to the changed conditions of existence of imperialism continues. The development of strategy in NATO is thus influenced by the conclusions drawn by the principal powers of NATO from the failure of attempted aggression in Europe against the CSSR (1968), from the third and fourth aggression of Israel in the Middle East (1967, 1973) and from the defeat of the United States in Vietnam (1971).

Influential circles in the United States, but also in other major NATO powers, nourish the hope that innovations in military techniques could again enlarge the maneuver area for the military might of imperialism, and open up new possibilities for military strategy. "A remarkable series of new technical developments," speculates the Pentagon director of research, Malcolm R. Currie, in May 1974, "has brought us to the threshold of a real revolution in the conduct of war."⁷ These American politicians, industrialists and military men hope, above all else, by long-term investment in military research and armament to achieve a breakthrough in the area of so-called postatomic weapons, to exchange the existing balance of power between the USSR and the United States in their favor. This does not by any manner of means preclude continuation of work being done in the United States on the further qualitative development of atomic weapons systems.

The technological breakthrough to new strategic weapons is being strenuously sought for with programs which in part strike one as fantastic. For example, American military men are speculating on the exploitation of certain types of electromagnetic waves, of antigravitation, of antimaterial and of plasma with which to carry on war.

Less fantastic than these plans of apocalyptic warfare which reach far into the future is the development of climatological and geophysical weapons with whose help planned floods, droughts, coastal tidal waves and other natural catastrophes are to be let loose against the potential enemy, and also the military utilization of laser beams. It is precisely this last which is regarded by the American military as having the richest prospects in the near future. The devastating effects of such war materials was vividly demonstrated by the American attempts at meteorological warfare in Vietnam.

Just these few examples alone make clear the immediacy and compelling necessity of the most recent Soviet motions in the UNO for the conclusion

of a convention to prohibit such weapons which fundamentally change the environment of mankind.

The direction taken by the technical efforts of the United States which has been sketched here shows that the ruling groups of US imperialism continue to hope as they have always done to achieve their strategic global goals with the help of military might.

Developmental Tendencies in the Military Strategy of the Pact

Three tendencies above all which have become visible in recent months are herewith singled out.

First, the military leadership of the United States wants to organize the targets and phases of deployment for nuclear weapons more selectively and more flexibly. By doing this new opportunities for the use of military might as a political resource are to be opened up without setting off an immediate escalation into a general nuclear war--for that is the way they are speculating at the Pentagon.

These changes in planning nuclear targets and deployments have been taken over by NATO by a confirmatory decision of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) at its 11-12 June 1974 meeting in Bergen, Norway.

Second, questions of functional warfare are being accorded more and more space in the military strategy discussions of the principal NATO powers and in those of the respective appropriate institutions of the Pact. From the general staffs of the leading European NATO states--especially the FRG and Great Britain--come considerations concerning a possible "total conventional war." US Secretary of State H. Kissinger generalizes these considerations concerning NATO military strategy in his fashion and emphasized: "Military challenges on the conventional plane will conceivably be more difficult to block. The political and military significance of tactical armed forces grows as a consequence...They are the most important tool of our diplomacy in times of crisis."⁸

Third, the activities of the principal NATO powers are increasing in the effort to coordinate and gear together military strategy more closely with the non-military areas of the double strategy. Greater room for freedom of maneuver is to be won in the span between war and peace and also for the utilization of military might as an instrumentality of policy.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the activities of NATO for safeguarding the monopoly capitalist order in their member states are growing ever stronger. This tendency is a reaction to the polarization of class forces. On the occasion of his November 1974 visit to the FRG, Secretary Schlesinger, with an eye on the internal political situation in various

Pact states, emphasized that "the FRG, a bastion of NATO, in view of political circumstances in Europe...also bears an essential responsibility for the defense of its partners."⁹ In this context the comments about a kind of "new Marshall Plan" for South European NATO states also are to be posted here.

Over and beyond this, demands are growing lively within NATO for extending its pretended sphere of influence. This is true both of the purposeful negotiations with Spain, to win it over as a kind of silent partner for the Pact, and for the efforts to build up positions on the African and Near Eastern coasts that lie across the Mediterranean from the NATO states. And for this reason also quite extensive armed forces of the Pact are deployed there. Not counting France, their strength comes to more than 1.1 million men, which is to say just about 16 percent of the total strength of the Pact.

In addition to that, notions are gaining influence in NATO, to widen the sphere of operations of the Alliance beyond the Tropic of Cancer to the South, in order to take control over navigation routes in the South Atlantic, the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean. In November 1974, THE TIMES reported NATO Secretary-General J. Luns as having declared: "NATO is well aware of the enormous importance of the Cape route and of the Indian Ocean, especially access to the Persian Gulf, and has already carried out special studies of measures to be taken in time of war."¹⁰

The openly pro-NATO positions of the Peking leadership group ought not to go unmentioned, for these are naturally built into the calculations of the NATO political and military strategy, even if with certain reservations, and are clearly directed against the policy of peaceful coexistence of the community of socialist states.

Summing up, the conclusion follows that the principles of the double strategy govern decisively the policy switching positions of the NATO states. This culminates, as B. N. Ponomaryov, leader of the CPSU delegation to the Consultative Conference of the Communist and Worker Parties in Warsaw, formulated it, in the fact that "political detente has still not led, as is well-known, to an end of the armaments race, inclusive of the nuclear one," "that material preparations for war persist as a matter of fact, and that the danger of war has not grown less."¹¹

Intensive Rearmament of the NATO States

Notwithstanding all appeals and proposals of the community of socialist states, of the UN and other forces concerned about peace, the dominant states of the Pact are increasing their armaments efforts. Since 1960, for example, armaments expenditures of the entire Pact have risen by more than 50 percent, and in the FRG by even more than 90 percent. Just in the

last 3 years the North Atlantic Pact with \$114.6 billion in 1972, \$121 billion in 1973 and \$131.6 billion in 1974 (of which \$44.4 billion from European NATO states), executed the highest armaments expenditures until then in its 25-year history.

These enormous armaments expenditures, which manifest a rising trend despite the growth of detente, constitute only the quantitative side of the armaments race. The qualitative is revealed by the increasing concentration on ways and means of arming with the most modern conventional and nuclear weapons from tactical to the strategic areas. This was explicitly emphasized at the 16th NPG meeting in December 1974, wherein nuclear weapons are revealed as continuing to be the backbone of NATO military strategy.

In contrast with the last half of the 1960's, the portions allocated for investments in the budgets of the principal NATO powers is growing by leaps and bounds. The investment portion of the 1974 FRG armaments budget rose to DM 9.7 billion from DM 6.6 billion in 1968, which means it rose to 130 percent, with further growth in prospect. Just in the period 1966-1972 the United States expended \$57.5 billion in addition for research and development of a military nature. That is a multiple of the expenditures of all the other NATO countries for similar purposes. The Pentagon, 24 December 1974, released the information that the development of 42 new weapons systems in the United States during the period up to 1990 will cost almost \$148 billion.

The FRG also increased in considerable measure the portion of the total armaments budget that is going for research and development in armaments. This portion which came to DM 956 million in 1967, was already running at DM 1.133 billion in 1970, and had reached DM 1.375 billion by 1974.

Rearming with increasing emphasis on quality became clearly visible as a dominant trend in NATO, and also in France. The ruling powers of the military-industrial complex in the NATO states see in forced rearmament of this kind a decisive factor in their efforts to change the military balance of power.

This process is not proceeding free of contradictions. In 1974, for example, the ruling circles of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, as well as Great Britain and Italy, came forward with demands, in fact with programs also to a degree calling for a reduction in armaments expenditures and in troop strength.

So far, however, the principal initiators of forced rearmament, the United States and the FRG, have succeeded in countering this tendency, in the first instance by measures promoting improvements in the quality of the armed forces even those of these states also. The press of the FRG confirms this:

"The FRG is taking on more and more obligations (in NATO--author's comment) and therewith is growing to be the banker and military commander in the Community (EEC--author's comment)."¹²

Table 1. Armed Forces of the NATO States Stationed in the FRG as of 1974

Country	Total	Land Forces	Air Forces
USA	206,000	175,000	31,000
Breat Britain	59,600	55,000	4,600
The Netherlands	8,900	4,600	4,300
Belgium	31,700	29,000	2,700
Canada	5,000	2,900	2,100
France	67,000	58,000	9,000
Total	378,200	324,500	53,700
FRG	495,000*	334,000	104,000

*Including the FRG Navy

The military strategic goal for the present-day development of the armed forces of NATO is to perfect them as much for use in the kinds of wars foreseen by flexible military strategy as for their employment in crisis management, and not least, to build them up for purposes of internal repression. Let us take up more pointedly two of the basic guidelines underlying the development of NATO armed forces.

First: "Quality comes before quantity," which implies an increased number and reinforcement of the combat units. In conformity with this principle is the tendency for NATO to go over to professional armies or to mixed forms combining professional and conscript armies.

Second, maintaining and deepening military integration in NATO. This applies to the further interweaving of the armed forces of NATO. The strengths of the so-called NATO triads, which are composed of strategic armed forces, tactical nuclear armed forces and a power conventional potential must, the way Secretary Schlesinger demands it, "be fitted into one another seamlessly," must "be woven together into one another."¹³ (Also see Table 1)

The further adjustment of the structure of the NATO military organization to meet the needs of flexible military strategy also serves to deepen integration. A typical example of this was the creation in 1974 of the High Command for NATO Air Forces in Central Europe, with headquarters in Ramstein, FRG. NATO circles see in this newly constituted command

"apparently the most important step" toward improving the tactical-nuclear and conventional striking power of the Pact in the Central European area. Other activities in this direction are the creation of further permanent grouping of NATO naval forces, for example in the North Sea. The debate about a new organization of the area structure on the northern flank of the Pact still continues. Also being considered is a "Central Office for Crisis Management" with headquarters in Washington.

Building up military integration in NATO has for its principal content above all joint rearmament efforts by the Pact states united together in the Europe Group. The 11 December 1974 communique of the Defense Planning Committee of NATO pointed this out emphatically. Over and beyond this, the ministers of the 10 member states of the Europe Group of the Pact reached the following conclusions with respect to rearmament:

Raising military budgets by \$4.5 billion (some 4 percent);

Additional new forces to be placed in service:

ground forces: 563 combat tanks; 1157 other armored vehicles; 1134 anti-tank weapons (400,000 light antitank weapons during period, 1973-1976);

air forces: 238 fighter and marine reconnaissance planes; 123 land-based helicopters; 836 antiaircraft rockets; 530 antiaircraft cannon.

naval forces: 10 escorts and destroyers; 2 submarines; 17 helicopters for use at sea;

Qualitative modernizations to be undertaken by 1978:

ground forces: 3500 combat tanks (weapons, fire control, armor);

air forces: 600 machines (facilities for electronic warfare); 168 machines (laser range-finders); 68 aircraft (stronger power units); over 80 anti-aircraft rockets, improved versions of Nike and Hawk rockets;

naval forces: 57 aerial missile units, 51 torpedo units, 52 electronic guidance systems, 12 artillery systems, 27 electronic warfare systems, 136 air to ground missile systems, and 174 torpedo systems for navel planes.

The guidelines sketched here correspond to the overall skeleton program for NATO armaments for the 1970's, the Directive AD-70.

In 1974 this rearmament was accompanied by extraordinarily intense maneuver activity by NATO. Like all the bigger maneuvers of the Pact armed forces since the beginning of the 1970's, these last year displayed with special clarity specific elements of the kinds of war appropriate to flexible

military strategy. They served above all for testing the various stages of escalation from crisis management to limited war with deployment of nuclear weapons. The NATO maneuvers bore not only the character of war exercises directed against states of the Warsaw Pact, but were within guideline limits training under conditions as close to those of real war as possible also laid on as demonstrations of military strength. Over and beyond this NATO maneuvers are also intended to put the partners themselves under pressure. The NATO maneuver series conflict with the process of international detente.

With this intensive rearmament the principal powers of the Pact want above all to give the double strategy the military support they are striving for, and to check centrifugal tendencies within NATO. This led to the result, as it was assessed by the GDR Minister for National Defense, Army General Heinz Hoffmann in the fall of 1974, that "facing us in the form of the armed forces of the United States, of the FRG and of NATO generally there is today a military machine which, armed in the most modern way and thoroughly ready for war, is the most dangerous and the strongest that imperialism has ever brought forth."¹⁴

From this arises the task of the socialist states not to relax in their efforts, in alliance with all forces interested in peace, to make the process of political detente irreversible, and by appropriate measures of military detente, to supplement and expand it. As Col Gen Kessler declared at the 13th plenary session of the SED Central Committee, for this reason there have been undertaken also by us in the GDR "manifold efforts for the perfection of defensive capacity in all areas of national defense on the basis of the decisions of the Eighth SED Congress..."¹⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A Edition), 14 September 1974.
2. USIS (Washington), 20 Aug 74.
3. Ibid.
4. Quotation from WEHRKUNDE (Munich), Vol 11, 1974.
5. Cf. A. Charisius, T. Dobias: "The 'Atlantic Declaration'--an Anti-socialist Compromise Between the United States and the European NATO States." In: MILITAERWESEN (Berlin), Vol 1, 1975, p 29 ff.
6. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (New York), 3 Jun 74.
7. NEWSWEEK (New York), 6 May 1974.

8. USIS, op. cit.
9. DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG (Duesseldorf), 14 Nov 74.
10. THE TIMES (London), 28 Nov 74.
11. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, op. cit., 18 Oct 74.
12. BONNER RUNDSCHAFF (Bonn), 12 Dec 74.
13. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, op. cit.
14. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, op. cit., 12 Oct 74.
15. From "The Speeches Given During the Discussion at the 13th Session of the SED Central Committee," Berlin, 1974, p 112.

CLOSER COOPERATION WITH SOVIET FORCES URGED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 98A-104A

[By Lt Gen F. Peter]

/Excerpt/ Jointly-executed exercises and maneuvers play a significant role in the strengthening of our alliance. In the course of their execution, army members of the participating armies experience directly our comradeship-in-arms.

Such measures contribute palpably to the strengthening of combat power, the deepening of the internationalist class-conscious education and the military mastery of the soldiers, noncoms junior lieutenants and officers of all the participating commands and troops. They serve as indices of the status of training and at the same time show the directions for further emphasis in training subjects in future work.

The Supreme Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces emphasized the role of joint exercises by stating: "The joint troop, fleet special and command staff exercises have a special significance, serving, together with war games, carried out according to the plans of the integrated supreme command and of the national commands, to obtain uniform concepts in questions of the art of war and the organization and leadership of combat engagements of the united forces. The exercises and maneuvers serve to perfect the collaboration of the armies and fleets and to deepen the reciprocal understanding among the army members."¹

Joint exercises develop and strengthen the comradeship-in-arms and at the same time they have a great military significance. They are the real

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school of brotherly friendship and comradeship for the soldiers of our allied armies. In the course of their execution the army members get to know each other as they jointly solve the most variegated military problems, jointly obtain the skills required for combat and understand their internationalist duties in performing them. Their friendship and mutual respect as well as their mutual trust and understanding are reinforced.

The great combat experiences, the high state of training and the superior moral traits of our Soviet comrades-in-arms allow NVA members to experience the veracity of the continual challenge--"to learn from the Soviet Army means to learn to be victorious." Not least of all, the demonstration through joint exercises of the increased defensive strength of our fraternally allied states serves to mobilize the members of both armies for their further and dependable military protection. Proof of this was provided by such important maneuvers on the territory of the GDR as "Quartett," "October Storm," "Comradeship-in-Arms" and a multitude of joint exercises with the participation of commands and troops of all services of our armies.

Four socialist armies took part in the first joint maneuver executed in 1963 on the territory of the GDR. The maneuver had the designation "Quartett." The participating forces acted for the first time according to a uniform concept and under a single command. This took an important step on the road towards purposeful joint military action. In the course of the further development of our alliance, formations and units of the ground forces of the NVA took part in exercises in the Peoples Republic of Poland and in the CSSR.

The climax to date of the steadily increasing collaboration in the military sector was provided by the "Comradeship-in-Arms" maneuver of 1971 which brought together all of the socialist armed forces integrated in the Warsaw Pact. Besides the superior military results obtained the participating troops demonstrated the growing cohesion and cooperation of the socialist armies in providing a dependable protection of the achievements of their peoples linked by solid bonds of friendship.

These operational-tactical exercises were participated in by tactical troops and formations as well as units and formations of the components services and specialized troops. Such an extensive participation of the component forces and means places high demands on commanders and staffs. The deployment of the most varied arms, special troops and services of the allied armies on the battlefield was a crowning achievement of military mastery, providing visible proof that our forces are in a position to solve combat missions jointly. The examples that left lasting impressions on army members are legion. I am thinking in this connection of offensive actions of our motorized infantry and armor units with air and fire support by Soviet tactical aircraft and artillery units, of amphibious and air-borne landings established with the transport vehicles of our Soviet friends, or of the breaching of water obstacles by our troops thanks to Soviet bridging equipment and many other measures.

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A particular expression of the joint fulfillment of combat tasks by the allied armies is provided by the attachment and detachment of units and formations as well as of combat service and support units. All the troop and commands of the military coalition are in position today to act in all questions of combat operations on the basis of uniform concepts employed by all the operational and tactical units of the other national armed forces of the alliance.

From what was stated above, a multitude of conclusions emerge for the land forces of the National Peoples Army of the GDR concerning the future collaboration with the allied socialist armies and in particular with the staffs and troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG).

Concerning Some Experiences Gained From Joint Exercises with the Soviet Army

Command and troop exercises carried out jointly with the Soviet Army become high points of common training the better we prepare purposeful actions already in the organizational and planning phase. In this connection it is necessary to build on the joint training operations that have already been carried out "to generalize the experiences of operational and combat training, particularly as derived from troop and operational exercises, to draw theoretical conclusions and to introduce all that is positive into troop practice."²

Joint exercises give us the opportunity to enrich the theory of the art of war, they contribute markedly to the improvement of the training of commanders and staffs and of the combat training of troops and to clarify the questions of troop command and the cooperation of forces. In this way our common views of the principles of the employment of troops as well as of their armament and equipment on the basis of the latest achievements of socialist military science are strengthened and reinforced.

Joint exercises also serve the purpose of monitoring combat readiness, of assessing the organizational capabilities of the commanders and staffs in respect to troop leadership. They also indicate the training status achieved by army members.

Results obtained in the course of such exercises allow us to make exact comparisons at any point with the high state of training of members of the Soviet army. To cite just one example, I would like to point to the superior achievements of Soviet Guards demonstrated in the context of the "Sewer" command post exercise. The Soviet comrades registered exemplary times in giving alarm signals and in achieving combat readiness. In the course of the entire exercise, the commanders and staffs demonstrated high professionalism a good work organization, an effective control of modern technical command means as well as a rapid and extensive mission preparation

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for their subordinate troops. Effective troop leadership and collaboration with the staffs of the NVA land forces was guaranteed in all phases. This fine performance of our comrades-in-arms did not only have a stimulating effect on our army members, but it provided commanders and staffs primarily with valuable suggestions for further improvement of their command activity.

As is confirmed by the experiences obtained in joint exercises with the Soviet Army, the collaboration among the commands at all levels has gained a steadily increasing importance. Just as in past years the demands placed on the extent and content of our common activity in the manifold political and military sectors of the army have increased, so the command tasks geared to joint action which are placed on commanders and staffs are increasing in a like manner. For their fulfillment the exchange of operational groups and of signal units and equipment among the cooperating staffs and troops have proved themselves to be effective besides the collaborative efforts of commanders in the decisive questions of exercise preparation and troop cooperation. By these means close collaboration is guaranteed among the staffs and troops and the participating commands obtain the required information concerning the situation and tasks of their neighbors as well as other necessary data.

It is useful to put such forces and means under the control of the responsible commander and his staff in the planning, organization and conduct of joint exercises. Generally, greater attention should be paid to the organization and composition of the respective commands/staffs for these training exercises.

In connection with the fulfillment of these tasks the requirement for a command of the language of our Soviet comrades in arms asserts itself which insures the successful activity of the members of the operational groups of the commands as well as of the signal forces. It provides a decisive basis for a joint leadership of troops, for the organization of cooperation as well for the proper functioning of measures of combat support and combat service support. To train our commanders and staffs continually in this sector, requirements for the use of the Russian language are to be placed in the various training exercises.

Time and again the high value of uniform concepts and attitudes towards the manifold questions of military leadership asserts itself in the common work.

The uniformity of concepts and views has its deep cause in the uniform world view and socialist military doctrine. It finds its expression in the principles that are binding on all the socialist armed forces as well as in the coordinated demands of the various combat rules. The latter are forming the concrete basis for common training and create uniform criteria for the assessment of command and troop actions.

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A further reason for the effective collaboration can be found in the steadily increasing quality level of our cadre. Particularly those of the officers of the land forces of the National Peoples Army who were trained in Soviet military academies are accomplishing their leadership role in joint exercises in the various sectors in a continually improving measure. They have the highest objective potentialities for a fruitful cooperation in all sectors. The knowledge and experiences of these leadership cadre are to be transmitted in the widest possible measure to all army members, but particularly to officers. The commanders' training, exchange of experiences and other appropriate measures are to be used in this endeavor to a greater extent than heretofore.

In this connection also the increased contribution made by the NVA becomes visible based on its many years of experience in belonging to the Warsaw Pact. It is a contribution towards the enrichment of socialist military science. This concerns mainly questions that pose themselves in connection with the role and tasks of the land forces of the NVA within the coalition, but it also includes problems of general military theory significance. This discloses an important page in the dialectic of our co-operation which consists of the creative utilization of the wealth of Soviet military experience, in the generalization of new discoveries in the field of military science and in the elaboration of generally valid conclusions and tasks for our joint military activity.

On the basis of the experiences noted it will be necessary to solve such tasks as follow in the near future within the framework of the main tasks to be fulfilled in the current training year by the land forces:

- the further elaboration of uniform concepts pertaining to troop collaboration between the respective command levels of the GSFG and the NVA land forces pertaining to the organization and conduct of joint training measures,
- the further shortening of the times required to obtain a state of combat readiness of components and formations of the land forces on the basis of the excellent results achieved by the Soviet army and
- the execution of appropriate measures for the improvement of Russian language knowledge.

In the 1974/75 training year as well, the year of the 20th anniversary of our socialist alliance, we will make the exemplary achievements of our Soviet comrades-in-arms even more consistently our standards for the training of units, formations, components and staff of the land forces. This will take place in joint training measures. The fulfillment of the increased tasks set by the command instructions from higher headquarters for the further raising of the combat power and combat readiness of the

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NVA requires in the future as well, a steadily closer and deeper collaboration in all military sectors with the "regiment next door."

FOOTNOTES

1. Y. Yacubovski: Soyuz vo imya mira i besapasnosti narodov. In: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Moscow, 13 May 73.
2. A. A. Gretchko: "Vooruzhonniiye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva" (Armed Forces of the Soviet State) Moscow, 1974, p 331.

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NVA OFFICER INTERVIEWED ON RESULTS OF NVA-GSFG COOPERATION

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 105A-108A

[Interview with Col S. Braeunig, commander of a unit]

/Text/ /Question/ Comrade Colonel, your unit has been working closely for years with a Soviet Army unit. How are these fraternal relations reflected in the everyday life of soldiers?

/Answer/ In the past years a multitude of forms and methods of collaboration have developed between our regiment and a unit of the Soviet Army. Year to year we worked even more closely, hand in hand. The collaboration, which became more planned and purposeful throughout the years, also increased in scope and today is felt in every company and in every platoon. Particularly close contacts and many-sided cooperation exists between similar units of both formations; almost all the soldiers in these units know each other. In this way the solid fraternal relation with the Soviet Army has become a daily and direct personal experience for the members of our regiment. The mutual acquaintance of the soldiers of both formations starts with the day they are sworn in. Soviet comrades participate in the ceremony in our regiment; and it is always a reward and a deep experience for soldiers of our regiment to attend the solemn swearing-in of their comrades-in-arms.

The participation of Soviet soldiers in the first political training of our newly-called-up recruits has become a fine tradition. Similarly, soldiers of our regiment attend the first political schooling of their comrades-in-arms. In this way they gain at the same time an insight into the military everyday routine of the "regiment next door." This strengthens

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the feelings of solidarity and the ties between them. Our young soldiers are always impressed by the high sense of duty of the Soviet soldiers. This high sense of duty is always demonstrated most visibly during measures of joint training--a very effective form of collaboration among the units of both our formations which we intend to strengthen and to extend on the basis of the experiences made to date.

Both units are working together closely in the field of culture and sports. For instance there have been choral contests and for sports competitions members of the partner unit are always invited and included in the championship bouts.

Joint sports competitions are also the rule in the case of the numerous friendship meets at company level. The events organized with the participation of the children of the professional soldiers in both units also find a large echo. For the past few years for example, the Thaelmann and the Lenin Pioneers of the 5th to the 8th grade are celebrating their commemorative days jointly.

The many-sided close collaboration with the Soviet comrades, beginning with headquarters and extending down into the companies, the platoons and the squads, has a highly positive effect on the internationalist training of the members of our regiment and promotes among them the desire to prove themselves with quality performance as reliable allies in the fulfillment of their political and military tasks.

Certainly the close relations developed with the Soviet allies during their period of military service had something to do with the fact that 33 comrades among the former members of our regiment who were transferred to the reserve have volunteered for the construction of the Orenburg natural gas pipeline.

Question How are you preparing in your unit together with the Soviet allies, the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Army over Hitler fascism and of the liberation of the German people, as well as the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the Warsaw Pact?

Answer We are using the joint preparation of the 30th anniversary celebration of the victory of the Soviet Army over Hitlerite fascism and of the liberation of the German people to deepen the realization among the members of the regiment that all the changes in the international balance of power over the past 30 years are based on this decisive victory for the progress of mankind, that the foundation of our socialist state was also made possible by the sacrifices and the victory of the Soviet people and that our inviolable alliance with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, the solid anchoring of the GDR in the

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socialist community of states, is a guarantee for the further successful development of our fatherland.

It can already been seen that the preparation of the two anniversaries is accompanied by a notable increase within our regiment of the socialist competition: "SOLDIER INITIATIVE 75--United With Our Allies--Combat Ready and Strong!"

And of course the preparation of such jointly-celebrated anniversaries contributes to a still more effective organization of our good collaboration with our partner unit. The commands of both units have agreed on a series of measures to mark these two great holidays of our peoples and armies. First of all we plan to organize a joint cultural program which we will present before the members of our units and also to the public. A sports celebration of the alliance is planned. Friendship meets will take place at the company level. Wall newspapers are being exchanged.

A tradition circle in our regiment is researching the heroic deeds of members of our partner unit in the Great Patriotic War. In this connection, our FDJ members are working closely with the Komsomol organization. Another circle is looking into the development of the fraternal relations between the two units from their very beginning; a chronicle of these comradely relations is being created within the regiment. The impressions gained by soldiers in their collaboration with their Soviet comrades-in-arms are being written down. These notes are being used by both sides for their political work.

During the last FDJ meeting of the regiment, the youth objective "We are Studying Russian" was initiated in order to have better communications with the allies. Many initiatives in this direction have already been developed in the units.

The joint preparation of the two anniversaries thus includes manifold measures. It is our aim to involve all members of the regiment actively in one or another way in these preparations.

/Question/ You mentioned joint training as a very effective form of co-operation. What position does this activity occupy?

/Answer/ Years ago we started our collaboration with joint sports and cultural events. For some time now we are paying more attention to joint combat training. This is an expression of the qualitative development of our mutual relations because it is precisely in joint combat training that the goal of our alliance, the reliable protection of socialism is expressed most visibly. Although we are only at the beginning as concerns joint combat training and many reserves remain to be utilized, the activity has in some ways already become a tradition. Similar type units of both

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formations have been meeting for a considerable period already on the basis of mutual agreement to undertake joint combat training. Measures of tactical, firing, driving and protective defense training have already taken place. The agreement stipulates the subjects in which joint training will be undertaken in the course of the six month training cycle.

Performance comparisons for instance in firing practice as well as in performance norm training have been particularly valuable. The meetings and exchanges of experience among the commanders, staff officers, political workers and also young officers and training instructors of both units have also proved to be highly useful. I would like to emphasize this with two examples only:

The relationship between time spent and the results obtained in maintenance of equipment was not satisfactory in our regiment. An exchange of experiences which we conducted on this problem with our friends helped us a lot.

We also had the task of accomplishing a troop training exercise during a period of very inclement weather. As a preparatory measure for this exercise we conducted an experience exchange with the Soviet comrades. Our company commanders received a whole series of tips during this meeting which helped them in the successful accomplishment of the training exercise.

I want to take this occasion also to point to the positive influence which joint training exercises on the performance attitudes of the participating army members. In these joint events every one seeks more than normally to give his utmost which is reflected by the training results. Our mutual efforts aim at the further deepening and expansion of cooperation in the combat training sector.

Question / A many-sided close collaboration requires an efficient organization and leadership. Which experiences were you able to gather in this connection?

Answer / First of all I want to emphasize that our Soviet comrades display a great readiness for cooperation. This mutual readiness and openness provides a good foundation for the development of our mutual relations. Many questions that come up in the course of our cooperation are solved without complications and unbureaucratically directly between commander and commander or between functionary and functionary.

There is also always a strong push "from below" on the part of the military collectives, the basic party and FDJ organizations to expand and strengthen relations and cooperation in different sectors of our military life. This strong interest in the strengthening of relations is an expression of the fact that the close cooperation with our Soviet friends has become a need for our comrades and collectives at all levels. This too makes its

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organization and leadership a lot easier. The collectives themselves originate many good suggestions, ideas and initiatives.

Of course despite all this the process of collaboration cannot be left to itself. An appropriate planning and organization is required. We have concluded an agreement with the Soviet comrades which includes a statement of the joint measures that we intend to undertake. This agreement is always concluded for a six month training cycle. This has proved effective. This time frame is easily manageable for us. The measures can be coordinated within the regiment both as concerns timing and content. The agreement is always discussed at the beginning of each six month training cycle during a "Day of the Functionary" with all the functionaries of the units in order to inform them of all the points to be stressed and all the cooperative measures to be undertaken in the course of the six month training cycle.

In the life of the troops there are also always events that cannot be anticipated precisely for each half year or predicted for a precise day. We therefore follow the procedure which has proved effective to go over the agreement--our joint plan for cooperation--together with our Soviet comrades on a monthly basis.

The planning and purposeful direction of the cooperation between our units goes beyond the points specified in the plan and extends to other levels and sectors. Thus the chairmen of the innovator collectives for example coordinate their plans among themselves. The cooperation with the Soviet comrades has become an integral part of our total command activity.

Of course there are problems in the realization of the planned projects; things don't always go as smoothly as anticipated. The realization of our projects depends substantially on the help and support given by our superiors.

Question / What are the plans for the future expansion of the fraternal relations with our allies?

Answer / First of all it is important to translate the agreement that has been concluded, into action in a purposeful manner, because it is based on prior experience and has as its goal the further strengthening of our collaboration. It provides for concrete steps for a still closer cooperation in matters of combat training. The questions of combat training will continue to occupy the center of attention. We have made progress in this respect from one six month training cycle to another and will continue on this road. During the past few years new and more effective forms of collaboration have been found and tested--there are lots of reserves that can be brought to bear on this issue. Our comradely alliance relations have deepened from year to year, they are a matter of the heart and of the daily life of our soldiers and this will continue in the future.

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DETAILS PROVIDED ON TESTING OF UNIT PROFICIENCY

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 109A-115A

[By Lt Col A Preuhs]

/Excerpt/ The regular evaluation of the status of training attained by units in all training subjects is an integral part of combat training. The monitoring of the proficiency of the motorized infantry and tank units in the course of their six month training cycle is therefore a part of the leadership process of commanders. These evaluations are required as a part of the training cycle completion exams for each company/battery and for all motorized infantry and tank platoons after the completion of platoon training.

By means of the proficiency evaluations, the platoons are included for the first time in the periodic evaluations, such as inspections, final exams, etc. The commanders of troop units are thus in a position to assess the state of training of all motorized infantry and tank platoons in the first half of each six month training cycle and to draw the appropriate conclusions. They are thus placed in possession of the data required for their subsequent command decisions.

The Aim of the Proficiency Evaluation

At first the knowledge, capabilities and skills of the platoon and squad leaders are evaluated.

The platoon leader must be capable of:

--making proper decisions in complicated situations;

- formulating the combat mission precisely for the squads/crews, and, where present, for the reinforcing units, and doing the same regarding the combat support and combat service support tasks; organizing and maintaining the cohesive action of his unit;
- demanding the consistent and timely fulfillment of the combat mission;
- providing the correct and appropriate fire direction;
- maintaining continuous reconnaissance of the enemy and drawing the proper conclusions from this action for his own unit activity;
- properly employing the weapons and combat equipment of his platoon, to make full use of his unit fire power and that of the reinforcing fire, and,
- acting appropriately under the conditions of the employment of weapons of mass destruction.

Squad leaders/crew leaders must be capable of:

- quickly comprehending the commands (signals) of the platoon leader and of their appropriate execution with actions or instructions;
- properly directing fire, continuously observing the battle area and the quick reporting of reconnaissance results, evaluating targets appropriately in relation to the threat posed by them and of giving the proper fire commands for their neutralization, and of employing tactical combat equipment correctly;
- insuring the combat readiness of the squad/crew and the operational readiness of combat equipment under all combat conditions.

Furthermore, the degree of training of other army members is evaluated insofar as it affects important questions in typical combat situations. The evaluation is intended to determine the extent to which the members of the platoon have acquired a capability of acting together with a single purpose.

It also should be determined to what extent and with what quality the requirements of the combat training program--particularly that of the principal training branches--have been fulfilled.

On the basis of these data, commanders at all levels can determine the proper points of emphasis for further training and thus have a decisive influence on the fulfillment of the training program requirements while stimulating further initiatives for socialist competition among the army

members and combat collectives. This frees additional reserve assets and allows for an interim evaluation in socialist competition.

In summary this means that the evaluation of the proficiency of the motorized infantry and armor platoons has the following objective:

--to assess integrally the knowledge and skills acquired in tactical training,

--to measure the combat value attained by these units with the completion of platoon training,

--to perfect the training status of the platoons, and

--to create favorable conditions for future training at company and higher levels.

Especially for the tank platoons of the motorized infantry regiment this evaluation represents the final proficiency test before they are allowed to train jointly with their parent motorized infantry units. The same is true for the other branches, special troops and services. The preparation for this combined training ought to be the priority concern of units up to the completion of the final evaluation. It should be geared to socialist competition. This underlines once more how important it is to create the bases for a close unit cohesion starting not only with tactical exercises but already at the beginning of the six month training cycle.

The goals listed here encompass the main points of tactical training. Because it is only in tactical training that the knowledge and skills acquired in other branches of training can be put to the test in an integral way. Points to emphasize especially in the course of the evaluation are determined by the major unit commander. The following is intended to provide a few pointers in this direction. It is certainly not useful to treat all units in exactly the same fashion. In determining the points to be emphasized for a specific company, the following criteria and measures should play their role:

--the training status attained (which was determined through controls and training monitoring),

--special combat missions and tasks of the daily general military service.

A stereotype approach can lead to placing excess demands on certain units while others are not required to perform to the limit of their capabilities. The evaluation of unit proficiency is no general training standard which is included in the plans only on an hourly basis without determining specific tasks for specific units. Its objectives can be met only if

- the evaluation objective is determined in a timely fashion,
- the organization of combat training takes account of the objective and
- the results of the evaluation are appropriately utilized.

To realize these demands is not only the responsibility of the major unit commander but it is central to the command activity of the formation. The formation does not conduct any additional proficiency evaluations. The proficiency evaluation of the platoons therefore provides the decisive opportunity for the formation commander to judge the state of training of the platoons, to measure their combat value and to draw from this assessment the required command conclusions.

We have to take for granted that the quality of collective achievements in the following tactical exercises always will depend on the results attained in individual training and in small unit training. Combined actions of the separate arms, special troops and services presuppose that each collective is in complete command of its own special trade, of its own special tasks and then in combination with other units attains a higher quality threshold of combat value.

The Place of the Proficiency Evaluation in the Process of Combat Training

In order to evaluate the proficiency of a unit, the unit must first have created this proficiency. This takes place in the course of unit training:

- in the case of squad/crew training, in the course of combat drills and in unit combat firing or in combat drills of the crew;
- in the case of the platoon, in the course of combat drills during tactical training and in unit combat firing;
- in the case of the company, during combat drills, during tactical exercises with or without combat firing.

In this a relatively substantial role is played by the preceding basic military training that one third of the major unit has undergone. The quality of the individual training forms the basis for unit training. Each and every army member must have achieved his own combat readiness if he wants to perform successfully within his combat collective. This is attained during basic training and in training for those specialties which are essential for the activity of army members within their units.

Because of the importance of this individual training we would like to consider it as belonging to the first phase of the six month training cycle. The six month training cycle can be divided into two phases:

1. The phase of military basic training, of squad and platoon training, which ends with the proficiency evaluation of platoons;
2. The phase of training for reinforced companies and battalions, of tactical exercises with or without combat firing, which ends with the final evaluation including the evaluation of the proficiency of companies.

Four main points of emphasis are of decisive significance for the evaluation of the combat value attained:

- the establishment of the combat readiness of the newly called-up reservists (which is determined without any special examination),
- the proficiency evaluation of platoons and companies,
- the troop exercises,
- the testing of the collectivness of the platoons and companies.

The evaluation of the platoons is conducted as a rule during the first six month training cycle at the end of January to early February and in the second six month training cycle from the end of July to the beginning of August. By that time the necessary conditions for a substantive evaluation will have been created. The specific themes and training subjects selected depend on the substance of the evaluation decided on by the commander. In order to fulfill the planned objectives of the evaluation a specific sequence must be maintained in the planning process.

Figure 1 /not provided/ gives a general picture of the most important variable and constant training measures of a six month training cycle. It makes the following general provisions for the principal subject area of "tactical training":

1. The main training measures (training complexes, tactical exercises of the motorized infantry and armor companies) are to be planned and executed sequentially. The subjects and training complexes that are required for the fulfillment of the instruction objectives of the subsequent topics. Main training measures and the preceding topics may be considered as relatively constant.

The evaluation of the proficiency of platoons and the final examination are also relatively constant dimensions of the training process.

2. The tactical exercises from battalion upward are the variables of the training process and they serve the permanent maintenance of combat readiness. They can be inserted at any time during the six month training cycle into the training process without affecting to any substantial degree the logic of the process. These exercises include the preceding

combat drills of the reinforced battalion and, if required, the unit combat firing. They have to be preceded by such subjects and school drills as are needed to insure the success of the tactical exercises.

Content and Form of the Evaluation

The substance of the evaluation depends on the combat training program and other military regulations. Each commander, however, should strive to include only the actions that are most important for the respective units because neither time nor the existing possibilities permit the complete evaluation of all requirements. In connection with the projected objectives the substance of the evaluation may consist of the following teaching questions and elements:

1. Inspection of the Unit

- general discipline and order, appearance of the army members;
- condition of the combat equipment and armament, of the protective means against weapons of mass destruction and of signal equipment;
- condition of clothing and equipment;
- completeness of equipment and its proper storage;
- control questions to test soldiers' knowledge concerning the duties of commanders and other grades in combat, norms and employment potential of the weaponry;
- knowledge of the general command signals in combat;
- actions concerning and within the APC's and tanks, in particular the alert command and the seat order in the tanks;
- the bases of fire direction in the combat arm that is being evaluated.

2. Attack from movement or direct engagement with the enemy

- organization of the attack;
- approach to the enemy and combat deployment or preparation for the attack from an attack position (staging area for tanks);
- mounted or dismounted attack with combat vehicles against an enemy strongpoint;
- continuation of the attack into rear of the enemy's defense area;

--repelling of counterattacks and the subsequent final destruction of the enemy;

--pursuit.

3. Movement from attack to defense or movement to defense without contact with the enemy

--organization of the defense, particularly of the fire control system and the combat engineer preparation of the platoon strong point while in contact or without contact with the enemy;

--antitank barrier construction;

--command and control of the defense, repulse of the enemy in the attack, maneuver of forces and means available for the destruction of the enemy in a penetration and reorganization of the fire control system and of the defense fortifications;

--organization of the attack.

4. March Security

--organization of march security;

--actions during march security particularly in case of contact with the enemy;

--organization of a break.

5. Bivouacing or Quartering

--moving into bivouac area;

--organization of bivouac security;

--organization of engineer construction activity in the bivouac area;

--actions in case of attack warnings or surprise attacks by enemy on the ground or from the air;

--preparation of weapons and equipment for anticipated combat actions.

6. Reconnaissance

Combat reconnaissance troop

--organization of deployment and task organization by the troop leader;

--preparation of the platoon for commitment;

--penetration into the enemy's rear defense area;

--reconnaissance of strong points, nuclear weapons, tank and artillery units, radioactive terrain sectors (with the non-TOL nuclear radiation and chemical reconnaissance group), barriers, bridges, roads, fording points and water obstacles, as well as the reporting of target coordinates;

Raids

--organization of the raid and task organization by the platoon commander;

--preparation of the platoon for commitment;

--approach to the raid objective;

--attack and withdrawal.

Ambush

--organization of the ambush and task organization by the platoon commander;

--preparation of the platoon for commitment;

--attack and withdrawal.

In case special units are prepared and trained for special actions--for instance, barrier clearing and special detachments, actions as amphibious or airborne units, etc.--the evaluation can be given this particular content. But it must be insured that questions pertaining to other training subjects are included in a way that permits their comprehensive evaluation.

The multitude of the teaching questions listed demonstrates that seven training hours are not sufficient for their total coverage. It is therefore essential that the most important questions are selected and if necessary different ones picked for the different platoons. However at least three main instructional subjects and two training subjects are to be included in the testing. Tactical training occupies a central position in this. In principle each platoon is to be tested in offensive and defensive combat techniques. The particular questions selected on the ideas of the regimental commanders. It is the commanders and the units that are being tested. With the assistance of the norms, unit activities are evaluated in specially created combat scenarios, but the testing of the commanders' performance is the main issue.

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This is why the following areas of emphasis are to be included in all teaching questions selected by the regimental commander:

- the work of the section and platoon leaders on the terrain or with the aid of the sand box;
- the capability to reduce the tasks directly into a sketch map without first writing it in narrative;
- fire control in all phases of the engagement;
- organization of the fire control system in the defense and explanation of the decisions taken;
- organization of unit cohesion and integrity during the engagement;
- forward and rear area security before and during the engagement;
- general and appropriate security organization for engagements at night.

If the unit training terrain so allows and if the general actions are not affected thereby, platoons are allowed to use live ammunition to solve combat tasks in training situations. But this must not lead to the postponement of the evaluation or the shifting of the troop exercise area. Tactical training is to serve as the organizational form of the evaluation. This form insures that the commanders can determine the degree of unit proficiency and themselves influence the state of training. This form of training is explained in Part 1 of the tactical training methodology. The repetition of individual teaching points and elements is allowed only within prescribed time limits and can be defended only if mistakes can be eliminated in the shortest possible time and the prescribed subject matter is fully covered. In the case of teaching questions that have to be repeated the initially assigned grade remains valid.

The above contribution gives first of all, a general overview of the bases for the evaluation of unit proficiency. A subsequent article will explain how the concepts prescribed here are to be realized. By means of practical experiences gained in unit combat training all commanders are receiving pointers as to how this important task can be fulfilled still better in the second half of the 1974/75 training year.

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CONNECTIONS BETWEEN NUCLEAR STRIKE, FIRE, THRUST, MOVEMENT EXAMINED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 116A-119A

[By Lt Col M. Goebel, military scientist]

/Text/ The question of the connection between nuclear strike, fire, thrust and movement amounts to defining them as elements of armed combat. As the revolution in military affairs brought about changes in the theory of warfare, the question arose in this context whether the nuclear strike was a new separate element or should be seen as belonging to the element of "fire," which would alter its quality.

Thus a very interesting debate was carried on a few years ago in the journal MILITAERWESEN in which partly very contrary or, at least, diverse and at times one-sided points of view concerning the elements of armed combat were put forth.¹ Publications in the Soviet military press, direct exchange of experiences with comrades in the Soviet Army and other fraternal armies, and our own military science research have helped gain uniform views about this problem. In connection with that, some views had to be revised because they had not stood up to military practice.

Since then we have differentiated among nuclear strike, fire, thrust and movement as four elements of armed combat in a series of combat operations, that is, of the operation (the battle) and the combat of the troops on land, on water and in the air.

Nothing will change in that definition at present or in the future.² What will constantly change, however, is the quality of the various elements of armed combat. Therefore we are always facing the task to determine useful

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methods for the employment of forces and material, and for their operations and combat command. That must also be supported by rational forms and methods of combat training.

It means, for the command echelons and the troops, that they must focus on changes in the armament, equipment and structure of their own forces and the enemy's forces occurring at briefer periods. That is objectively necessary. Our own further training thus requires that we improve what we already know about the four elements of armed combat and find creative application for it in military practice.³

A few brief remarks are offered about the various elements and the demands they raise.

Nuclear Strike

A characteristic of the current development of military affairs is the fact that rockets for various purposes constitute the strongest nuclear weapons in modern armies.

Their tactical and technical performance parameters and design characteristics are constantly being modified and, in part, being replaced. In general, Western views underscore a simpler launch preparation, better launching possibilities, wider range, and improved strike accuracy, wider impact and increased mobility and maneuverability.

The effect of a nuclear weapon clearly differs from that of conventional arms.⁴ These means of mass destruction therefore fundamentally affect the laws, principles, rules, norms and methods of armed combat.

Soviet military science has shown that the nuclear strike has become an independent element in armed combat because it provides the possibility to strike important and worthwhile targets within a brief span, to destroy enemy installations, and to annihilate, or demoralize, the enemy's troop formations. Massive strikes, above all, permit to a certain degree an almost complete destruction of parts of the enemy's order of battle, whereby they also partly fulfill the tasks of fire, thrust and movement.⁵

This, in a sense, grants a predominant role to the nuclear strike. The employment of nuclear weapons, among other things, depends on the scope and strength with which conventional weapons are used in the combat and on the tasks which the various branches, special troops and services, coordinated with each other, have to fulfill when and where.

Victory over the enemy can never be gained by the use of only one type of weapon, even a nuclear weapon. Fire, thrust and movement therefore remain of vast importance, regardless of the scope and nature of the nuclear

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strikes employed. One must be aware in every situation, however, that the nuclear strike neither merely "supports" and "accompanies" nor "secures" military action.

Fire

Not only nuclear rockets, traditional weapons as well, such as artillery pieces, tanks, antitank and air defense weapons, helicopters and others, are being perfected or replaced by new types and weapons systems. As examples for the perfecting of combat technology we may here--based on data from the military press--refer to artillery and the combat helicopter.

Essential performance parameters of artillery are: Wider employment possibilities; larger range of the systems; greater effects on targets because of improved ammunition, higher firing speed and improved strike accuracy; better employment against armored vehicles in the direct line of fire; greater mobility and less maintenance.

The combat helicopter is gaining increasing importance as an element of fire. A highly efficient air weapon, it can attack moving targets, especially tanks, and thereby provide more fire support to ground troops.⁶ Such a helicopter has a relatively large carrying capacity, can take on various types of weapons and weapons systems, mainly antitank rockets, and fire control equipment, strike at armored vehicles from its own territory via large distances without being immediately hit by the enemy's air defense, has great maneuverability, a high flying speed and a long flying range.

Thus, apart from nuclear strikes, it is also possible by the fire from conventional weapons effectively to fight against the enemy at great depths and in various directions.

The fire not only has to prepare and support the thrust of the motorized infantry and tanks, it also must supplement, or create the conditions for, nuclear strikes. As there is only a limited supply of nuclear weapons available, their use must be assessed circumspectly and be carefully computed. In many cases the defense effort can also be satisfied through artillery fire or air strikes. When combat operations, at least in some stages, proceed without the use of nuclear weapons on either side, it is mainly up to the artillery troops to act during this period as the main fire power with their guns, howitzers and missile launcher units. Reliable and accurate mortars of all calibers also play a decisive role in this connection.

Thrust

Nuclear blast and fire can, to be sure, destroy large parts of the enemy's order of battle. Yet a combat only is completed when the enemy's territory has also been occupied.

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That always requires thrust, which combines a dense, well coordinated, accurate and well directed fire mainly from the weapons in the direct line of fire, including tanks, armored tanks, armored personnel carriers, with a determined advance, the movement of the units that are in direct contact with the enemy and which, as their combat situation requires, fight either from their combat vehicles or on foot. In this situation, attacking troops must always be ready and able, if necessary, to face the enemy in hand-to-hand combat while using rifles and bayonets.

Fire thus prepares, accompanies and completes the thrust, with the fire power from all weapons.

For the troops this means, among other things, that they must purposefully utilize the results of the fire from the higher command level and their own, boldly penetrate at depth, split, and destroy part by part, the enemy's order of battle, gain terrain and occupy important sectors and territories.

The thrust is thus an important component of the operations, above all in the main direction of the strike, and in sectors hit by nuclear strikes it may be possible for the thrust to be led with less intensity or to be omitted entirely.

Movement

Essential conditions for the movement, and thus for the thrust, are the state of development and the operational readiness of the tanks and the other combat materiel as well as of the support equipment. Much also depends on the degree to which reciprocal effects between man and technology have been recognized, clarified and taken into account. Important tasks in this respect have to be met by the technical services in securing the rear.⁷ This includes all those units which ensure the constant operational readiness of the various weapons and weapons systems.

Today all modern armies are fully motorized. The performance parameters of all kinds of vehicles and of the means of air transport are being improved. This helps perfect the troops' independence, enabling them to operate under any combat conditions.

The element of movement thus sets the conditions, during combat preparation as well as in the ensuing combat, through rapid shifting, the surmounting of all kinds of obstacles and the use of helicopters and transport planes, for placing one's troops in a favorable position vis-a-vis the enemy; deploying one's forces and equipment purposefully; utilizing nuclear blasts and fire early for penetrating, through gaps and breaches made by nuclear weapons, deep into enemy territory; having one's own troops evade enemy nuclear strikes; and fulfilling one's tasks while maintaining the highest possible degree of fighting strength and combat readiness.

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Along with the concept of movement--which is the main concept--the concept of maneuver is often used in a similar sense, with the latter concept more strongly emphasizing the change of the locality of nuclear strikes, fire, troops and supplies. The nuclear strike maneuver and the protective nuclear maneuver are included today among the well known forms of maneuver.

Concluding Remarks

Looking at the four elements of nuclear strike, fire, thrust and movement in context, one may summarize by saying that they are assuming an ever more complex and complicated character because of rapidly continuing military developments in military affairs and that they, as it were, extend from the single combatant up to the operational unit.

In other words: The elements of armed combat mentioned clearly reflect the coordinated efforts by the types of weapons, special troops, and services of the segments of the armed forces participating in their effort to destroy the enemy and win the victory.

In the interest of fighting strength and combat readiness, and of the main task to be met, it is necessary to make these statements on the general theory of warfare and, beyond that, of socialist military science basic to training measures, primarily in troop exercises, even in peace times.

As it becomes ever more difficult for the individual always to keep in mind all sides and aspects of the phenomena here explained, and of other phenomena, in the objective reality of armed combat, more intensive attention should be given to collective opinion formation in advanced officers training, starting with the command level, the special field or the activity profile.

These, I think, have been some thoughts about how the connection between nuclear strike, fire, thrust and movement has changed under current conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. See also M. Goebel: "Tactics--Unity of Theory and Practice." In: MILITAERWESEN Berlin, No 7, 1967, pp 989 ff; F. Gavrikov: "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Unit Tactics." In: MILITAERWESEN, No 4, 1968, pp 555 f; M. Goebel: "Fire, Thrust and Movement in General Combat." In: MILITAERWESEN (A Edition), Berlin, No 9, 1972, pp 107 ff; J. Reusch and H. Schulzendorf: "Fire, Thrust and Movement in General Combat." In: MILITAERWESEN , No 3, 1973, pp 126 ff; and "Die Revolution im Militaerwesen, Studienmaterial der Militaeraakademie 'Friedrich Engels'" ("The Revolution in Military Affairs--Research Materials of the Friedrich Engels Military Academy"), Dresden, Part I, 1964.

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2. This view by the author might be contested, however, by the following considerations. First of all, there are now, and there may be in the future, combat operations without the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear strikes thus are not a necessary element of armed combat. Secondly, there are still authors who, in contrast to this author, speak only of elements of combat, not of elements of operation. Cf. "Geschichte der Kriegskunst" (History of Warfare), Berlin, 1973, pp 604 f. (Editorial footnote).
3. See also H. Hoffmann: "National Defense Is a Concern of All the People." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A edition), Berlin, 12 Oct 74.
4. Cf. "Militaerlexikon," Berlin, 1973, pp 172 ff.
5. See also V. Reznichenko et al: "Taktik des allgemeinen Gefechts im Kernwaffenkrieg" ("General Combat Tactics in Nuclear War"), Berlin, 1971, pp 27 ff.
6. Also see V. Gatsolayev: "On Helicopters--Fire." In: MILITAERWESEN , Loc. cit., No 12, 1974, pp 109 ff.
7. Also see W. Friedrich et al: "Current Tasks of the Ground Forces Technical Services." In: MILITAERWESEN , Loc. cit., No 4, 1974, pp 115 ff.
8. Cf. "Militaerlexikon," Berlin, 1973, p 23.

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INFORMATION PROVIDED ON MAINTENANCE OF ANTEAIRCRAFT ROCKET SYSTEMS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 117B-120B

[By Maj G. Giese]

/Text/ All weapons systems of a country's air defense, which also includes antiaircraft rocket systems are subject to constant further development. It is based, in general, on scientific-technical advances and, in particular, on the state of development in offensive air weapons. What then characterizes modern antiaircraft rocket systems?

Present day antiaircraft rocket systems are marked by a high degree of automation and become ever more complex in character. The latter is reflected by the fact that--as functions require it--optical, mechanical, hydraulic, electrical, electronic and other technical systems are closely coordinated with one another. Typical properties of antiaircraft systems are the fastest possible operational readiness (in seconds), permanent combat readiness over long periods with a high reliability factor, easy maintenance and good repair conditions, and a modest demand for technical and service personnel.

In order to ensure these special requirements, designers, engineers and specialists of the manufacturer have provided antiaircraft rocket systems not only with outstanding combat characteristics, but also with a high degree of reliability and smoothness of operation. What then are the tasks the technical personnel /TP/ and the service personnel /SP/ are facing to ensure high reliability on a permanent basis? What are the demands made on the TP and the SP? From where do the TP and the SP get their information for having a target-directed influence on the reliability of anti-aircraft rocket systems? These are questions that are to be answered in the following article.

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TP and SP Tasks In Ensuring Permanently High Reliability

First--without offering any definition--we shall explain what we mean by high reliability over long periods (several years) of antiaircraft rocket systems. In the bibliography,¹ the following ideas are stressed: The outfitting is considered reliable when the following conditions exist: Work free from interference (without loss) within the time frame set down for the fulfillment of the combat task; rapid repair of technical deficiencies by the TP and SP, possibly without interruption of combat readiness or combat training; minor and relatively uncomplicated precautionary measures, in comparison with combat training; and simple operation.

For example, the Soviet military journal RED STAR writes about reliability in rocket systems: "There are two sides to reliability, one technical and one organizational. Whereas the former is taken care of constantly by the industry that makes rocket weapons in superior quality available to the various branches of the army, the second aspect of reliability concerns the use made of rocket systems and the ensuring of their permanent combat readiness, which are all tasks the troops have to take care of."² That is to say, the TP and SP of antiaircraft rocket systems are responsible for high reliability when they are in use, with the emphasis lying on improving the organization in technical engineering. The TP and SP must ensure a permanently high reliability of antiaircraft rocket systems by target-directed measures. The regular and irregular precautionary projects must always be carried out on a high level so that there will be the least possible losses during combat.

Another measure could be the training for restoring the operational use of antiaircraft rocket systems to reduce the time it takes to look for and eliminate interference factors.

Finally one should also mention the need to improve material safeguards. Optimum safeguards here are security for the technical service, the "DHS," /ready alert system/ and combat training with consideration for economic aspects.

Ensuring high reliability in antiaircraft rocket systems requires first a well trained and experienced TP and SP and, second, a well thought out system for compiling and analyzing experiential data.

Concerning Some TP and SP Requirements

In order to obtain a high reliability in antiaircraft rocket systems over many years, one must, above all, constantly raise the level of technical training for the TP and the SP through central training as well as through individual advanced training. Thus the TP and SP, along with thorough technical knowledge in antiaircraft rocket systems must know how to compile and analyze experiential data and must know reliability theory and practice.

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The constantly renewed attention to the creative realization of the above-mentioned requirements in daily practice is all the more necessary as, despite the higher training status of the TP and the SP, the proportion of interference factors caused by abuse, a poor manner of care and maintenance, and relatively faulty precautionary work, broken down in terms of sophisticated technical military systems, still amounts to from 18 to 59 percent.³

The following causes for it have been mentioned: Errors in the technical documentation or lack of attention paid to it; frequent change in service personnel or inadequate technical training; the lack of an operational system for going over the technical changes; and inadequate utilization of the experiential data for target-directed preventative activity, the improvement of the technical service, and optimizing material safeguards.

Table 1 is meant to underscore the great influence by the TP and the SP on the main reliability factor--transmission periods without interference (without loss). In drawing conclusions from this table, which essentially also applies to antiaircraft rocket systems (their electronic part), one may say: (1) The TP and SP are no passive observers of military systems but active users of them. Their aim lies in ensuring a constantly high reliability of the systems entrusted to them; and (2) the exploitation of analysed data shows the TP and SP their own strengths and weaknesses as well as those of the systems they were using.

Table 1

Use (State of Training of TP and SP)	Average operational period without inter- ference (h) of communications systems with "n" elements	n = 200,000	n = 9,000	n = 260
In the army (with personnel on rotation)	0.74	1.7	960	
Civilian use (with permanent TP and SP)	10	22	8,000	
In a research institute (higher technical cadre)	70	155	56,000	

The influence of TP and SP skills on operational periods without interference of a communications system.

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The Systematic Compilation of Experiential Data--Prerequisite for a Thorough Analysis

The recording and analysis of weak points in the process of their functional utilization is an essential prerequisite for exercising a target-directed influence on the reliability of antiaircraft rocket systems. This article will not deal in detail with other important factors for obtaining a high reliability. For establishing weak points in antiaircraft rocket systems it is necessary to collect certain data during operations. Once the experiential data have been worked out, selected and analyzed, they must make possible an influence on processes that are important for reliability, such as design, production techniques, storage and deposit conditions. Also, of course, for operations and technical safeguards. The data are all the more suitable and indicative here, the more truth there is in the experiential data collected and the larger the time span is throughout which they were collected. The latter presupposes the correct selection of experiential data by the analysts.

The documents presented in tables 2, 3 and 4 may serve as the author's proposal on which experiential data should be collected for antiaircraft rocket systems. The documents brought together are made up of:

- the evidence of defects possibly directly in the system (table 2),
- the evidence of instable parameters, likewise in the system, which should be produced during control and maintenance projects (table 3), and
- evidence for the statistical analysis, to be filled out on the basis of the two aforementioned primary modes of evidence, which should have to be sent to a central office of analysis that is in close contact with the manufacturer of the antiaircraft rocket system (table 3).

One question often asked by the user who also collects data is: What use, actually, has the data collection to me, which takes, relatively, a lot of time? This question must be dealt with in detail, because understanding the concern is an essential prerequisite for the quality of the data collection.

Data exploitation comes in two main parts: (1) Central exploitation of analyses by designers and producers and (2) individual analysis of the empirical data by the proper technical units in the staffs and by the TP and SP directly engaged in the systems.

The designers and producers try, through the analysis of the empirical data, to make constructive changes to increase the combat capabilities, reliability and smoothness of operation in the antiaircraft rocket system, and to make recommendations for the use of, or changes in, the precautionary controls, and to optimize the EWZ sets /sets of repair parts, tools and accessories/.

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Table 2

- 1 Serial number
- 2 Index of product
- 3 Product serial number
- 4 When was the disturbance observed (date, time)
- 5 At which operational routine did the disturbance occur?
- 6 Assessment of operational readiness (stage)
- 7 Indicate operational hours up to the disturbance
- 8 Undisturbed running time of the product, system, subsystem
- 9 Type of element that failed
- 10 Nominal value of the construction element
- 11 Index of cabin
- 12 Index of board
- 13 Index of block
- 14 Switchboard number of element
- 15 Time it took to find the cause of the disturbance
- 16 Time it took to eliminate the disturbance
- 17 Type of disturbance
- 18 Cause of disturbance
- 19 Time construction element was used up to the failure
- 20 Brief description of the trouble
- 21 Remarks

Trouble shooting index

Table 3

- 1 Serial number
- 2 Measured parameter (designation in supporting documentation)
- 3 Number of board, block, monitoring box
- 4 Value of parameter (according to instruction requirements)
- 5 Total number of measurements of parameter
- 6 Number of deviations of the parameter beyond permissible limits
- 7 Value of the parameter beyond permissible limits
- 8 Cause of parameter deviation and the method of correction used

Trouble shooting index for instable parameters

The individual analyses and exploitations by the TP and the SP and by the technical units and staffs supply answers to questions such as:

Which are the most reliable or unreliable construction components, blocks and systems with respect to the use to which the antiaircraft rocket system is put and in view of climatic conditions and other factors?

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Table 4

- 1 Serial number
 2 When was the trouble found (date, time)
 3 Product serial number and date of delivery
 4 Design number
 5 Block number } of the nonfunctional (faulty) ele-
 6 Description of the trouble
 7 Effect of failure (disturbance) on combat readiness
 8 Cause of the trouble, assessment of climatic influences
 9 Measures taken to eliminate the trouble
 10 Results of measures taken
 11 Suggestions for avoiding such troubles
 12 Average annual temperature
 13 t_{max}/T maximum temperature in interval T days } Year round characteristics in the
 14 T/L/t number of days in year (T) with absolute air humidity operations area of the products
 (L) higher than 80 percent at in question
 temperature (t)

Trouble shooting index for the statistical analysis of disturbances

What is the nature of parameter deviations, and do they yield any concrete indications with respect to maintenance and precautionary measures, especially with regard to the periodicity of such projects and the changing of construction components and blocks?

Are the most frequently needed construction elements and construction groups available in sufficient quantity in the EWZ sets of the user, and which elements absolutely have to be included in the EWZ set to ensure a constantly high operational readiness over longer time periods?

Is the organization of the system technically up to par with requirements?

What is good and what has to be improved?

Especially the TP and SP are enabled through the analysis of the empirical data to become more familiar with errors in operation and their effects on combat readiness, to determine weak points in the system and to ensure the requirements on bringing the system technically up to par.

Practical experience in running the antiaircraft rocket systems have shown that the analysis of empirical data has raised the sense of responsibility of the TP and the SP, led to a more suitable use of the systems, reduced

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the loss, interference and EWZ feeding period, improved the quality of care, maintenance and repair projects, increased precautionary construction element replacement, and improved the state of technical training.

All these factors have helped ensure a constantly high reliability and technical operational readiness over long periods of time.

FOOTNOTES

1. Fokin, Ya. G.: "Nadezhnost' pri Fkspluatatsii Tekhnicheskikh Sredstv" ("Reliability in the Exploitation of Technical Resources") Moscow, 1970.
2. Tolubko, V.: "Nadezhnost' Raketnykh Sistem--Osnova Boyegotovnosti" KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 May 1965.
3. Cf. P. Hummitzsch: "Zuverlaessigkeit von Systemen" (Systems Reliability), Berlin, 1969.

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2. Shishonok, N. A.: "Osnovy Teorii i Expluatastii Radioelektronnoy Techniki" SOVYETSKAYA RADIO, Moscow, 1964.

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BASIC TRAINING OF OFFICER CANDIDATES OUTLINED

- st Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 116C-119C

[By Commander W. Schuhmann, military scientist]

text When graduates of the Karl Liebknecht Officer Candidates School of the Navy take over, every year, responsible assignments on ships and boats, a new and important stage of development begins for these young people. Now they will have to live up to the demands of their career as young officers, as officers in charge in the military collectives. And those demands are growing all the time. The Minister for National Defense, at a conference of young officers, commented as follows about it: "Getting through with school, the graduate starts a new stage of his life. By one leap, as it were, from one day to the next, his responsibility goes up, and now he is no longer responsible only for himself, but mainly also for a collective of people whom he must lead. Now he, who previously could ask all the questions, is the one who has to give the answers." What then is it that makes this transition so important?

The young officer assumes the full responsibilities, with all the rights and duties, the function of an officer in charge of a military collective, which he must lead, train and educate.

The young officer for the first time receives the direct responsibility for the skills, arms and equipment, for their being constantly operational and combat ready and for being correctly and efficiently used.

The young officer must independently organize and carry out the service in his sphere of responsibility, the political-ideological work, the political and combat training of his subordinates and other tasks.

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The young officer, along with fulfilling all the tasks that his position demands of him, must increase his own advanced training. He must learn how to apply in practice the knowledge and skills he gained at the officer candidates school, must gather experiences and, in particular, further develop and reinforce his capabilities and abilities.

It is therefore the task of the officer candidates school to prepare the young people systematically for their career and to form socialist officers personalities who are loyally dedicated to our party and to our state and who are ready and able to fulfill their tasks from the very first day of being assigned an officer's position.

The decisive importance here, along with supplying thorough knowledge and complex skills, lies in giving the graduates practical facilities. This task is being realized by the overall educational and training process at the officer candidates school, which includes the practical training in the units of the People's Navy. The proportion of the various training areas and subjects in this process differs, in terms of substance and objective, according to the program. So, some thoughts will be presented on the place occupied here by the subjects in the department of "basic training" at the officer candidates school, and on the experiences gained during the implementation of the demand for a practice-oriented and navy-related training and for raising the candidates' qualifications for their fulfilling their tasks as trainers and educators, as leaders of socialist military collectives.

There is great variety, substantively, in the training subjects of the department. There are, on the one hand, subjects with a high degree of theoretical training (basic training in mathematics and engineering, for example) and, on the other, subjects of predominantly practical training (for example, general and physical training). In addition to supplying the needed knowledge and skills in all training subjects, some of them offer various potentials and possibilities for having a stronger impact on the education of the officer candidates, enabling them to become political and military leaders, educators and trainers of their subordinates, while still developing their own facilities and capabilities.

This gave and gives the department the task to take hold of these specific potentials and possibilities and to examine them in order to focus, as a result, the training in these subjects substantively still better, and methodologically more effectively, on qualifying the officer candidates for meeting their tasks in their first assignments as officers.

Essential prerequisites for carrying out these demands for a practice-oriented and navy-related training in the department were the revision of the school's programs, the achievement of a complete understanding and of uniform views on this matter among all teachers, and improved qualifications for the training officers and the civilian instructors in the

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department, so that their training would in every way meet with the Navy's demands. The 1972 program was built with the participation of all of the department's teaching personnel on the basis of the requirements, as confirmed by the deputy minister and commander of the People's Navy, for the graduates of the officer candidates school, with more attention given to naval requirements and to a better coordination among the various training areas and subjects. This improved the focus on higher qualifications and on the independence of the officer candidates in substance, organization and method.

Through creative dispute within and between the collectives of the department, through exchange of experience and through generalizing good examples, but also through a party-minded confrontation with wrong opinions and existing shortcomings, essentially uniform views and opinions were created among the teaching personnel. Today one may say that the department's instructors have properly understood and are meeting the demand for a practice-oriented and navy-related training with the goal of raising the qualifications of the officer candidates so that they will meet their tasks in their first officers' assignments.

There were still other tasks that had to be solved in taking care of the objectives of the department's new school programs: Teaching methods had to become more effective; officer candidates had to get more involved in the educational and training process; their training in teaching methods had to be improved; the instructors had to be systematically upgraded by being assigned in troop components and units of the People's Navy; and the skills of the immediate superiors of the officer candidates had to be more strongly affected.

The more efficient structure given to the work in teaching methods aimed at providing teaching personnel with better methods in their educational specialty and at preparing training subjects and themes, in substance, and in organization and methods, in such a way that the higher demands would be completely satisfied. This required that large parts of the teaching and training materials had to be newly prepared or revised. Good results were achieved here by the method of having individual teachers prepare the new materials after the collective had discussed their underlying concepts and the new drafts had been put up for debate before each collective concerned. This, on the one hand, took into account the knowledge and experience of all participating teachers and, on the other, prepared the teachers for teaching in accordance with uniform ideas and on the basis of uniform teaching documentation in any given field.

Involving the officer candidates in the preparation, implementation and exploitation of training offers favorable opportunities for forming and reinforcing abilities and skills. It greatly helps train the officer candidates for independence and helps qualify them as training officers

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In their future career. Great efforts were undertaken in this department in solving these tasks by finding and testing specific possibilities and forms in the various subjects of the training.

Among them, the following possibilities have shown promising results:

The use of officer candidates in the independent solution of tasks within the framework of on-going training as, for example, in the preparation, implementation and exploitation of experiments, and this also included the preparation and handling of selected elements of training during practical exercises.

The use of officer candidates in assigning concrete tasks to them in functions pertaining to the fulfillment of training tasks as, for example, station chiefs during training on the operation of stations, or by putting them in charge of physical training, fall-out exercises, general training or military training.

Training situations calling for decision making, where the officer candidates, after receiving assignments from the training officer with specifics attached, could act independently and thereby demonstrate their knowledge and skill.

The ways and means of the active involvement of the officer candidates in the training depend in every given case on the objective and content of the topic, on the form of training, and on the knowledge and skill the officer candidates possess. The possible elements for it must be selected by the training officer and clearly differentiated. They must not include any assignments which to solve the officer candidate is not yet properly prepared, on technical and methodological grounds, and which would make him "despair."

Target-directed aid and instruction by the training officer as well as a concrete manner of exploiting the measures the officer candidates have independently carried out are essential preconditions here for forming and reinforcing abilities and skills.

Closely connected with this at the officer candidate school of the People's Navy was the improvement and more effective handling of training in instruction techniques for the officer candidates generally, and in preparation for meeting specific tasks, like their use as group leaders in raw recruit units, in particular. To that end, training in instruction techniques was thoroughly reorganized.

Along with the periodic training in instruction methods which is part of regular military training (task preparation), this other form of concentrated training in instruction methods produced good results. The officer candidates, for example, based on the program of general basic military

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training, are prepared during one week in instruction techniques for their assignment as group leaders. The object of this training in instruction techniques is the specialized technical and methodological qualifications given the officer candidates in solving their tasks as group leaders. The consistently favorable evaluation of the performances in these assignments confirms the suitability of this form of instruction techniques training.

The systematic training given to the training personnel in the troop components and units of the People's Navy significantly helped implement the demand for practice-oriented and navy-related training. It has proven useful here rotationally to assign also the training officers, who are teaching at the officer candidates school, to troop components and units of the People's Navy. In addition to handling functional duties in any of those assignments, those officers, given individual tasks, had to solve those specific assignments for the benefit of their own fields of instruction. Those assignments helped them become more familiar with the requirements and conditions of the Navy, which they could then take into account in their major duties.

Points of emphasis here were matters of combat training, service organization, leadership in political-ideological work, and the organization and implementation of political and combat training. Along with personally experiencing the service aboard the ships and boats, the training officers obtained valuable advice and suggestions for their own work, especially through close contact with young officers. As to the civilian training personnel of the department, good results were achieved by their active involvement or participation in matters of the military training of the officer candidates (military training, comprehensive military navigation exercises, and so forth). These instructors thereby received impulses for their own work, especially for a methodical approach to matters of qualifying the officer candidates, enforcing uniform demands in training, and the personal position to be taken vis-a-vis the officer candidates. Complex work was performed in the department in further qualifying the immediate superiors of the officer candidates. It aimed at exercising a stronger influence on the organization and course of everyday service and on the training itself that those officers are responsible for (the military training, for example).

Points of emphasis here were improvement in the work of providing better qualifications for the officers in their meeting their training tasks and in enforcing uniform demands in training; uniform training documentation for carrying out the military training; and uniform views on the observance and enforcement of military provisions in the organization and implementation of everyday service as well as in the manner of leadership provided for the subordinates.

For this it has been found useful to hold intensive training courses with the officers of the training battalions.

One may summarize by saying that the basic training department makes a great contribution to, and holds a high responsibility for, the preparation of officer candidates who are getting ready for their first assignments as officers. All instructors of the department have made great efforts in recent training years to live up to the demands for practice-oriented, navy-related training. One must draw general conclusions on, and purposefully further improve, what was achieved and what was experienced, the forms and methods that have proven themselves.